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Article 3

THREE FACES OF DEFERENCE
Paul Horwitz*
Deference-the substitution by a decisionmaker of someone else's judgment for its own-is a pervasive tool of constitutional doctrine. But
although it has been studied at more abstractlevels of jurisprudenceand at
very specific doctrinal levels, it has received surprisingly little general attention in constitutionalscholarship. This Article aims to fill that gap.
This Article makes three primary contributionsto the literature. First, it
provides a careful examination of deference as a doctrinal tool in constitutional law, and offers a taxonomy of deference. In particular,it suggests
that deference can best be understood as relying on two separatebut overlapping grounds: deference on the basis of the legal authority of the deferee, and
deference on the basis of the deferee's epistemic, or knowledge-based, authority.
Importantly, this Article suggests that deference cannot be examinedfrom the
standpoint of the deferring institution-usually,the courts-alone. Rather,
we must also take into account the obligations of deferees, which should
demand deference only for those decisions reached in the full andfair exercise
of their legal or epistemic authority.
Second, this Article demonstrates the practical benefits of this richer
understanding of deference by applying it to a recent case in which the
Supreme Court confronted competing claims of deference: Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR),

in which the

Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Solomon Amendment, which
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requires law schools to provide access to campus for military recruiters. In
FAIR, the Courtfaced claims of deferencefrom Congress, actingpursuantto
its military powers, andfrom the law schools, which invoked deference both
as expressive associationsand as universities. The Court's treatment of these
competing claims to deference was unsatisfactory. The Court gave too much
deference to Congress, and too little to the law schools. In particular,it failed
to accord them the deference they deserved as universities, which serve as vital
"FirstAmendment institutions" in the universe of public discourse. The
Court's failure to soundly address these competing claims of deference
bespeaks a largerfailure to theorize the nature of deference and the occasions
on which courts should defer. Thus underequipped, the Court was left at sea
when confronting multiple institutions competingfor deference in the same
case. At the same time, the law schools themselves may have fallen short in
meeting their own obligations as deferees in this case.
Finally, this Article shows that its examination of deference lies at the
intersectionof two developing areas of constitutionalscholarship: the study of
constitutional decision rules, and the study of institutionally oriented
approaches to the First Amendment. It argues that these two emergingfields
are linked by the concept of deference, and both might learn a good dealfrom
each other.
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INTRODUCTION

The law of the First Amendment has set itself a Sisyphean task.
And like Sisyphus, it is doomed forever to be disappointed.'
Here is the task: those who interpret and enforce the First
Amendment have "a deeply felt desire... to achieve noninstrumental
certainty in the law." 2 Courts interpreting the First Amendment seek
to understand it in strictly legal terms-to erect a doctrinal framework
that is generally applicable and need not bend to every new circumstance. In the First Amendment, and in constitutional law more generally, courts seek to realize this goal by viewing the law through a lens
of 'Juridical categories," 3 in which all speakers and all factual questions, no matter how varied and complex, are compressed into a series
of purely legal inquiries. 4 In short, the law of the First Amendment
5
yearns for acontextuality.
Signs of this urge toward acontextuality may be found throughout the law of the First Amendment. 6 For example, the Court has
long refused to recognize any special privileges for the press, notwithstanding the textual anchor of the Press Clause, because doing so
1 This theme is developed at length in Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007).
2 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist's View of ConstitutionalImplementation and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 173, 174 (2006), http://
www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/1 19/marchO6/hills.pdf.
3 Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L.
REV. 84, 119 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles]. See generally Frederick Schauer,
Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 781-85 (1998) (describing this
tendency).
4 See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 461, 564 (2005);
Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REv.
1747, 1759-60 (2007) (noting a tradition of lawyers, judges, and scholars who prefer
to frame legal analysis in terms that "appear[] lawlike to the core, such as state action,
public forum, limited-purpose public figure, suspect classification, fundamental
right," and so on, or in terms of Dworkinian "moral abstractions," rather than in "realworld, prelegal, institutional terms").
5 See Schauer, supra note 4, at 1749 (noting the law's "frequent and at times
peculiar reluctance to employ the extralegal world's institutionally demarcated categories," particularly in the field of constitutional law); cf. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, It
Takes a Vision: The Constitutionalizationof Equality in Canada, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
363, 370 (2002) (noting "the notoriously disembodied and acontextual world of
law").
6 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 564.
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would require courts to consider who qualifies as ajournalist, a factual
question that raises "practical and conceptual difficulties of a high
order. '7 Thus, the Court's fear of context has led it to "render[] the
Press Clause . . . a virtual nullity."'8 Similar observations could be
drawn from across the wide realm of First Amendment law, from the
free exercise of religion, to public forum doctrine, to that most prominent symbol of acontextuality, content neutrality doctrine. 9
In short, the Court has strived for a First Amendment that is all
rule and no context.' 0 From stem to stern, its approach has been
"institutional [ly] agnostic[],"" with little evident "regard for the identity of the speaker or the institutional environment in which the
12
speech occurs.'
13
And here is the dilemma: it turns out that context does matter.
Time after time, the Court has found that its acontextual framework
fails to fit the factually rich, socially embedded world in which speech
actually occurs. Thus, the Court conceded in a case involving the use
of filtering software by libraries that general principles of public
forum doctrine were "out of place in the context of this case,"' 4 and
that it must instead "examine the role of libraries in our society. 1 5 In
another case, the Court abandoned content neutrality doctrine
because the defendant, a government arts funding body, necessarily
had to make content-based distinctions.16 Still more recently, the
7 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
8 Horwitz, supra note 4, at 564-65; see also Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional FirstAmendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1257 (2005) ("[E]xisting First Amendment doctrine renders the Press Clause redundant and thus irrelevant, with the
institutional press being treated simply as another speaker."). See generally Paul Horwitz, "Orof the [Blog], "11 NEXUS 45, 48-62 (2006) [hereinafter Horwitz, Blog] (investigating the interplay between various theories of the Press Clause and the
blogosphere).
9 For examples, see Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1504-10.
10 See, e.g., James Weinstein, Speech Categorizationand the Limits of FirstAmendment
Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).
11 Schauer, Principles, supra note 3, at 120.
12 Schauer, supra note 8, at 1256.
13 Cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
14 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality
opinion).
15 Id. at 203.
16 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998); see also
Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier,
63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1995) (noting the tension, in cases like Finley, between
the Court's customary focus on content neutrality and its "manifest desire.., both to
permit the state to establish and support cultural institutions and to confer on them
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Court, in the course of trying to clarify its doctrine concerning government employee speech, could not say whether its new rule would
apply in cases "involving speech related to scholarship or teaching" in
8
public universities. 1 7 Other examples abound.'
If acontextuality has been the goal toward which the Court has
been striving, it is thus clear that it is one the Court can never reach.
This is the Sisyphean dilemma courts face as they shape the law of the
First Amendment. On the one hand, courts (and, often, scholars' 9 )
feel compelled to craft pure, formal legal doctrine. In Rick Hills' evocative words, they feel "the call to hunt for the Snark of 'pure,' noninstrumental constitutional value." 20

On the other hand, they are

confronted with brute facts that ill fit the hermetic doctrinal structure
they have erected. The result of this dilemma, critics have charged, is
an increasing state of incoherence in First Amendment doctrine, as
courts are caught in the tension between doctrinal generality and factual specificity. 2 1 Courts require some vehicle to bring responsiveness
into the law 22 despite their natural urge toward acontextuality.
When faced with this dilemma, one way the courts respond is
with deference. When they defer, courts suspend their own judgment
in favor of the judgment of some other party-another branch of gov-

at least some considerable degree of constitutional autonomy"); Schauer, supra note
4, at 1755 & n.39 (criticizing the contextual blindness of the Court's free speech
cases, including Finley).
17 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
18 See Horwitz, supra note 1, 1507-09.
19 See generally Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. R~v.
1, 11-22 (1998) (observing the tendency toward creating pure doctrine in constitutional scholarship, without endorsing it).
20 Hills, supra note 2, at 174.
21 See Robert C. Post, RecuperatingFirstAmendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249,
1270-79 (1995); see also Schauer, Principles, supra note 3, at 86-87 (noting "an intractable tension between free speech theory [in general] and judicial methodology [in
particular cases]" and suggesting that "[i ] f freedom of speech ... is largely centered
on the policy question of institutional autonomy, but the Court's own understanding
of its role requires it to stay on the principle side of the policy/principle divide, then
the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional differentiation will prove pro-

gressively more injurious to the Court's efforts to confront the full range of free
speech issues").
22 Cf PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAw AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 73-78
(2d ed. 2001) ("The quest for responsive law has been a continuing preoccupation of
modern legal theory.").
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ernment, 23 an administrative agency, 24 a private institutional actor,2 5
26
or a quasi-public actor.
The relationship between deference and the law's contextual
dilemma is complex. But it is clear that that there is an intimate connection between these two phenomena. In deferring to other actors,
courts open. up a space for shared legal and constitutional interpretation by other actors who may be closer to the facts on the ground.
Thus, deference allows courts to bring responsiveness into the law by
taking themselves out of the equation.
The tension between acontextual law and real-world factual diversity and complexity is particularly pervasive throughout constitutional
law. It is not surprising, then, that deference pervades constitutional
law as well. What is surprising is how underexamined deference is as a
transsubstantive tool of constitutional law. This gap is especially surprising because deference has been on constitutional law's scholarly
agenda since at least 1893, when James Bradley Thayer published his
27
seminal article on judicial review.
To be sure, scholars have been aware of deference as a doctrinal
device. It has been studied at high levels of abstraction by jurisprudes. 28 It has also been examined at high levels of specificity with
respect to particular constitutional or quasi-constitutional doctrines.
23 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-79 (1892) (setting forth the "enrolled
bill" doctrine); Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Doff, ConstitutionalExistence Conditions
andJudicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-81 (2003) (discussing the enrolled bill
doctrine and noting that it constitutes a form of epistemic deference granted by the
federal courts to Congress).
24 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
25 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(describing "[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials" as "the exercise of editorial control and judgment," which is entitled to substantial deference by courts and lawmakers); Randall P. Bezanson, The
Developing Law of EditorialJudgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 776 (1999) (arguing that
many courts in libel cases carve out a space for deference to the press' decision
whether to publish particular stories by asking whether the press actor was exercising
sound "editorial judgment").
26 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (deferring to admissions decisions by a state law school, not because of its status as a state actoralthough it was this status that triggered Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny in the first
place-but because of its status as a university).
27 SeeJames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).

28

See, e.g.,

PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF DEFERENCE

(2002); Scott Brewer, Scien-

tific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998); Heidi M.
Hurd, ChallengingAuthority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611 (1991).
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For example, endless pages have been devoted by administrative law
29
scholars to the study ofjudicial deference to administrative agencies.
And constitutional law scholars have discussed deference within the
30
context of specific government institutions, especially the military
3'
and prisons.
Between the extremes of abstraction and specificity, however,
there has been a startling gap in the legal literature.3 2 There has been
surprisingly little effort to fill the space left open in the study of deference as a general principle of constitutional law somewhere on the
middle rungs of the ladder of justificatory ascent. 33 We need an
examination of deference's role in constitutional law that is both sufficiently abstract and sufficiently practical to shed some light on this
pervasive doctrinal tool, and that might at least lead to its being recognized as a central subject of constitutional law.
This Article seeks to fill that gap. In what follows, I will identify
and examine deference as a general device in constitutional law. I will
also offer a practical application of this study, by limning the varied
faces of deference that play a prominent role in the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights,
Inc. (FAIR). 3 4 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a variety of
First Amendment challenges to the Solomon Amendment,"3 5 under
which Congress threatened to penalize law schools that obstruct the
government's use of military recruiters on campus. 36 That provision
was challenged unsuccessfully by law schools that wished to bar oncampus military recruiters who discriminate on the basis of sexual
3 7
orientation.
29 A search in Westlaw's Journals & Law Reviews (JLR) database reveals at least
1987 articles discussing "Chevron deference." See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
30 See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
Daniel J. Solove, The
32 As always, there are honorable exceptions. See, e.g.,
Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOwA L. REv. 941
(1999). As I suggest below, however, Solove's valuable work nevertheless leaves much
room for further inquiry. See infra note 56.
33 See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 353, 356-57 (1997)
(defining justificatory ascent).
34 547 U.S. 47 (2006). For clarity's sake, I refer to the respondent group, the
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, by the short form "FAIR." I refer to the
case by the italicized short form "FAIR."
35 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 541(a), 110 Stat. 186, 315 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 & Supp. V
2005)).
36 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 70.
37 See id. at 52-53; see also 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) ("No funds...
may be provided ...to an institution of higher education if the Secretary of Defense
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The Court's decision in FAIR nicely illustrates both the pervasiveness of deference as a subject of constitutional law and our limited
current understanding of this device. In the course of its decision, the
Court encountered no fewer than three demands for judicial deference, one favoring the appellant and two favoring the respondents:
deference to the military, deference to expressive associations ("Dale
deference"), and deference to higher educational institutions (" Grutter deference" 3 8). In the end, it placed substantial weight on the military deference claim. It gave some weight to the expressive
association claim, but far less than might have been expected given
the Court's sweeping statements about deference in its prior decision
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.3 9 And it gave no weight at all to the
Grutter deference argument.
FAIR is ultimately unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the
Court's failure to seriously theorize about the nature and scope of deference and the proper occasions for its use left it ill-equipped to deal
with the competing claims of deference that arose in the case. Second, the Court's urge toward acontextuality left it unable to fully and
openly acknowledge the importance of the context in which the FAIR
challenge took place-the domain of a "First Amendment institution," 40 the university.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a broad discussion
of deference as an element of constitutional law. It examines some of
the many varied contexts in which the Court has employed deference,
and provides a taxonomy of deference as a device in constitutional
law. It suggests that the Court's use of deference may be divided into
two principal categories: deference on the grounds of the legal authority of the deferred-to institution, and deference on the grounds of the
superior knowledge, or epistemic authority, of the institution. 4 1 As we
will see, these categories are hardly watertight. It also examines an
aspect of deference that is all too frequently ignored: the obligations
has a policy or practice ... that either prohibits, or
access by military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting

determines that that institution ...

in effect prevents ...
....
.).

38 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 509.
39 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
40 See generally Horwitz, supra note 4 (discussing the importance of adapting general First Amendment principles to the specific institutions and environments
involved in a given case).
41 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christoper D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IowA L. REV. 1267, 1278-79 (1996). Similarly, Larry Solum
divides the universe of deference into two categories: "'deference to authority' and
'epistemic deference.'" Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/
2007/09/legal-theory-4.html (Sept. 16, 2007, 08:06).
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of the deferee. I argue that deference carries with it significant obligations on the part of the deferred-to party.
The next Parts apply this richer understanding of deference to
the FAIR case itself. Part II provides some background on the Court's
ruling in FAIR Despite the conventional wisdom that this was an easy
case, I will suggest that the Court's opinion actually obscures a host of
difficult First Amendment questions. Part III returns the focus to deference by examining the competing claims to deference raised in
FAIR I will argue that the Court accorded too much weight to the
claim of military deference and too little to the claim of Dale deference. Moreover, the Court essentially ignored the most important
claim of deference raised by FAIR the universities' claim to deference
as First Amendment institutions. Had it taken that claim seriously, the
Court would have given far more weight than it did to the universities'
claim that they were entitled to exclude military recruiters from law
school campuses. This conclusion may be cold comfort to the law
school plaintiffs in FAIR, however. A key aspect of deference involves
the obligations of the deferred-to party. There is good reason to question whether all of the plaintiffs in FAIR met those obligations.
Having examined deference in general as a tool of constitutional
doctrine, and FAIR in particular as a case study in deference, Part IV
concludes by linking this Article to larger currents in contemporary
constitutional theory. It suggests that deference stands at the intersection of two separate streams of constitutional scholarship, ostensibly
distinct but in fact deeply interrelated: the developing study of constitutional decision rules, and the emerging body of First Amendment
scholarship that seeks to advance a more institutionally oriented
approach toward free speech law. By studying deference, we may
enrich our understanding of both of these new streams of legal scholarship-and find that they have much to offer each other.
I.

A TAXONOMY OF DEFERENCE

At first blush, the claim that deference is an underexamined subject in American legal scholarship may seem extravagant. After all,
deference has featured in countless discussions in the academic literature of constitutional law and its cousin, administrative law. The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, for example, revolves
around the extent to which one branch of the federal government
must defer to another branch's interpretation of some constitutional
question. 42 Within administrative law, vast forests have been felled on
42 See, e.g., Note, And usticiabilityfor All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation
of Powers, 109 HARV, L. REv. 1066, 1077 (1996) (noting, critically, that "[i]n recent
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the subject of deference to administrative agencies. 43 And scholars
have often discussed deference to other specific government institutions, such as the military, 44 prisons, 4 5 public schools, 46 and
universities.

47

What is generally missing from these treatments, however, is an
effort to treat deference as a distinct subject worthy of discussion on
its own. Commentators often assume the importance of deference as
a principle within administrative law, as a factor in the debate over the
legitimacy of judicial review and the corresponding legitimacy of constitutional interpretation by other branches, 48 or as an element in
cases involving specific government institutions. But these treatments
are content to treat deference as a bit player in a larger discussion of
specific areas of constitutional or administrative law. They almost
never treat deference as a subject in and of itself. Even when discussing deference as it applies to particular subfields of constitutional law,
few scholars unpack and examine deference itself as a separate topic
worthy of discussion. 49 And fewer still have treated deference as a
transsubstantive doctrine, unmooring it from specific areas of inquiry
and looking at deference as a freestanding legal principle in constitutional law.
There are honorable exceptions, but they still leave much to be
discussed. For example, Daniel Solove has written valuably about the
50
effect of deference on the courts' interpretation of the Bill of Rights,
but his account of deference is rather more genealogical than analytical. Similarly, C. Thomas Dienes' attack on deference to government
interests in First Amendment cases involving "the military and other
special contexts" critiques the courts' policy of deference in those cirtimes, judges have incanted the separation-of-powers mantra as if it were coterminous
with deference to the legislative and executive branches").
43 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44 See infta notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 441, 450-55 (1999); Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YAUE L.J. 459, 479-83
(1996).
46 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 455-58; James E. Ryan, The Supreme
Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1369-89 (2000).

47 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 4, at 495-97 (citing literature).
48 See, e.g.,
Lawson & Moore, supra note 41, at 1274-79.
49 See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, A Blueprintfor Law School Engagement with the Military,
1J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 473, 498 n.109 (2005) (citing examples of scholarly discussions treating deference to the military as a well-established tradition without questioning that underlying tradition).
50 See Solove, supra note 32.
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cumstances but says relatively little about what, precisely, deference
means. 51 At the other end of the spectrum, Philip Soper has offered
up a sophisticated book-length treatment of deference 5 2 but it is
pitched at a high level of abstraction, focusing more on the broader
philosophical question of political obligation than on the practical
53
questions raised by the courts' deference to specific institutions.
Still other scholars have noted the transsubstantive nature of deference in constitutional law, observing that deference is a common feature when courts deal with a number of different institutions, but have
54
offered little direct discussion of deference itself.
In the final analysis, then, there are surprisingly few efforts to
directly define and confront the nature of deference as a standard
move in constitutional argument. It remains, in Solove's words, "malleable, indeterminate, and not well-defined." 55 This is unfortunate,
given the sheer magnitude of occasions on which the courts defer to
various public and private actors in constitutional cases. As Solove
writes:
The Court frequently accords deference to the judgments of
numerous decisionmakers in the bureaucratic state: Congress, the
Executive, state legislatures, agencies, military officials, prison officials, professionals, prosecutors, employers, and practically any

other decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise. The
scope of deference is staggering, and the areas within its dominion
often affect fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection .... [And yet,]
while deference has been examined in various contexts, it has never
been analyzed in depth as a fundamental issue for constitutional
56
jurisprudence.

This Part takes up that challenge. I seek here to bring some
greater clarity to our understanding of deference as a transsubstantive
51 See C. Thomas Dienes, When the FirstAmendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and
Other "Special Contexts, "56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 827-43 (1988); see also Stanley Ingber,
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1, 53-104 (1990) (looking at the role of deference in
various First Amendment contexts).
52 See SOPER, supra note 28.
53 See Frederick Schauer, Deferring, 103 MICH. L. Rv.1567, 1576 (2005) (review-

ing

SOPER,

supra note 28).

54 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 442-58.
55 Solove, supra note 32, at 945.
56 Id. at 944-45. Although Solove valiantly takes up the call for a comprehensive
examination of deference in his own article, it focuses more on tracing the historical
roots of the deference principle in constitutional law than on unpacking the concept
of deference itself. The latter is the approach taken here.
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element of constitutional law. In what follows, I offer a working definition of deference, defend it against a competing definition, and distinguish it from some closely related concepts. I then unpack the
varied reasons why courts defer to other institutions, examining
courts' use of deference under two general categories: deference
based on legal authority and deference based on epistemic authority.
With this general schema in hand, I raise a number of questions about
the relationship between deference and constitutional interpretation,
the scope of deference itself, and the surprisingly puzzling question of
how courts know whether, when, and how much to defer to other
institutions. Finally, I emphasize an often overlooked, but vital, aspect
of deference: deference implies not only an obligation on the part of
the deferring party to suspend its own judgment, but also a corollary
obligation on the part of the recipient of deference to exercise its own
authority responsibly within the boundaries of that deference.
A.

Defining Deference

As Henry Monaghan observed some time ago, deference "is not a
well-defined concept." 57 Indeed, at least as the term is generally used,
it may not even consist of a single concept, but rather may be "an
umbrella that has been used to cover a variety of judicial
approaches."5 8 Nevertheless, I want to begin by suggesting a general
definition of the concept.
For purposes of this Article, we may define deference in terms
suggested by Robert Schapiro: deference involves a decisionmaker following a determination made by some other individual or institution
that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same
question independently. 59 Although Schapiro is speaking directly in
terms of judicial deference to other branches of government, 60 the
point can be generalized to a variety of decisionmakers. Indeed,
Philip Soper's broader philosophical treatment of deference arrives at
a similar conclusion, arguing that "[d]eference suggests that I am acting in some sense contrary to the way I would normally act if I simply
considered the balance of reasons.., that bear on the action." 6 1 Sim57 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
4 (1983).
58 Id. at 4-5.
59

REV.

1,

See Robert A. Schapiro, JudicialDeference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and

Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) ("Judicial deference
acknowledges that, based on the interpretation of another branch of government, a
court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would otherwise reach.").
60 See id. at 664-69.

61

SOPER,

supra note 28, at 22.
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ilarly, Monaghan concludes that deference to an administrative
agency, "to be meaningful," necessarily implies that the agency's view
displaces "what might have been the judicial view res nova."62 Deference, then, involves a decisionmaker (D1) setting aside its own judgment and following the judgment of another decisionmaker (D2) in
circumstances in which the deferring decisionmaker, D1, might have
reached a different decision.
In adopting this definition, I set aside for now questions involving
the scope of deference, which often plague judicial decisionmakers.
D1 might defer to the judgment of D2 altogether; it might defer only
on questions of fact, while reaching its own conclusions on questions
of law without any deference to the legal judgment of D2; or it might
adopt some other approach. 63 Nevertheless, deference exists as long
as D1 follows D2's determinations along at least some dimension.
I also largely set aside the potentially troubling question of the
degree of deference, although a few words are in order. While purporting to defer to the determination of some other decisionmaker, courts
regularly caution that their deference is "not absolute. '64 That phrase
may refer to at least two different phenomena. A court's reference to
the nonabsolute nature of deference may signify the extent to which
the court will follow the judgment of D2. Or it may refer to the
court's unwillingness to defer unless certain preconditions for deference have been met, 65 as when, for example, a court refuses to defer

to prison officials unless they "present credible evidence to support
'66
their stated penological goals.
The first notion, that of deferring "up to a point," or of deference
as a thumb on the scales but not a complete surrender of judgment,
may qualify as a form of deference under the definition I have offered
above. A court in these circumstances may still reach a conclusion it
would not have reached independently; however, if the court ultimately resists substituting D2's position for its own, it may be difficult
67
to call this deference under my definition.
62 Monaghan, supra note 57, at 5.
63 For discussion of the law-fact distinction, see, for example, Ronald J. Allen &
Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769, 1771-90
(2003); Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact

and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 917-25 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 232-39 (1985).
64

See, e.g., Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002).

65 For a valuable discussion of the preconditions for deference, see

ROBERT

C.

DOMA-INs 257-65 (1995).
Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis omitted).

POST, CONSTITUTIONAL

66

67 See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (criticizing such a reading of deference by Lawson and Moore).
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Does the other reading of the statement that deference is not
absolute-the reading that focuses not on the degree of deference
per se, but on whether certain preconditions for deference have been
met-involve deference under my definition? That depends. If the
precondition for DI's application of deference is that it independently agrees with D2's determination, then following D2 in these circumstances does not amount to deference in any useful sense of the
word. On the other hand, if D1 will follow D2, regardless of whether
it would otherwise have reached the same conclusion, as long as certain prior conditions are met-for example, that D2 has followed
some degree of due process in reaching its own determination-then
we can properly call this deference.
We have thus already arrived at a provisional definition of deference: Dl's willingness to follow D2's determination, despite the fact
that it might have reached a different conclusion had it reasoned
independently. We have also noted a number of other concepts that
may accompany deference, including the scope of deference, the degree
to which D1 is willing to defer to D2, and the relevant preconditions
that D1 may insist upon before it will defer to D2. Let us test this
definition against a competitor.
In a valuable discussion of deference in the context of interbranch interpretations of the Constitution, Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore describe "deference" as a court's "contingent judgment,
perhaps based on an assessment both of the interpretation and of the
interpreter, that a particular Congress or court in a particular circumstance is likely to have correctly interpreted the Constitution."' 68 In
their view, when federal judges review the judgments of the political
branches, they may properly defer when that deference is the result of
"a contingent judgment that the views of the political departments
are, in the specific case at issue, likely to reflect the answer that a thorough, fully-informed independent examination of the issue would
yield."69
This statement is capable of a number of saving constructions.
But it serves here mostly to illustrate the sorts ofjudgments by D1 that
should not be treated as acts of deference under my definition. Lawson and Moore may mean only that, in areas in which the political
branches are likely to be correct,judges may cut short their own "thorough, fully-informed independent determination of the issue," 70 and
defer to the other branches at that point. That would indeed consti68
69

Lawson & Moore, supra note 41, at 1271.
Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).

70

Id.
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tute deference. But if they mean that in cases involving the political
branches, courts must always engage in an independent 'judgment... that a particular Congress or court in a particular circumstance is likely to have correctly interpreted the Constitution,"' 7 1 then
we cannot call this deference. 72 One does not defer by simply "acting
on [one's] own understanding of what the balance of reasons . . .
supports," 7 3 any more than I can be said to have deferred to my neighbor if, having discussed the matter together, both of us decide independently to buy the same type of car. I may coincidentally agree with
my neighbor's taste in cars. Or my neighbor may have supplied reasons to buy a particular car that I ultimately decide are compelling.
But deference is not the same thing as agreement. I have not
deferred to my neighbor unless, to some extent, I substitute his judgment for mine, and follow his conclusion even if I would have reached
a different decision on my own. In Robert Schapiro's neat phrasing,
74
"deference implies difference."
Having thus defined deference, it may be useful to distinguish it
from some concepts that may be confused with it. First, we must distinguish between deference and obedience, although this distinction
turns out to be somewhat tricky in practice. If my daughter puts her
toys away when I tell her to, she does so out of obedience, not deference. Similarly, a lower court that follows the binding authority of a
higher court obeys that higher authority; it does not defer to it. Deference implies some freedom to act. Although D1, in deferring to D2,
puts aside its own independent judgment in reaching a decision, DJ's
decision to follow D2 is properly termed deference only if Dl could
reach an independent judgment if it chose to.
Deference may appear to shade into obedience if it is adopted as
a general, ongoing policy. Thus, once courts have adopted a general
policy of deferring to the judgment of military officials, 75 it may
appear that they are simply obeying the military's judgment. But
71

Id. at 1271.

72 Nor could we call it deference if D1 only purported to give consideration to D2,
while rejecting any conclusions by D2 that it thought wrong. Cf Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to AdministrativeInterpretationsof Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 514 (referring

to "mealy-mouthed" uses of the word "deference" that do not "necessarily mean[]
anything more than considering those views with attentiveness and profound respect,
before we reject them").
73 SOPER, supra note 28, at 22.
74 Schapiro, supra note 59, at 665.
75 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[W]hen evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.").
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although the Supreme Court may follow a general policy of deferring
to military judgments, it is not obliged to do so, 76 and might conceivably reject that policy, in isolated cases or altogether. Thus, deference
implies that D1 has some power of independent decisionmaking, but
chooses to displace its own judgment with that of D2; obedience
implies that D1 follows D2's judgment because it has no choice but to
do so.
The situation may be complicated where some independent controlling authority dictates to D1 that it defer to D2. For example, in
Rostker v. Goldberg,7 7 in upholding the exclusion of women from the
Selective Service System against a constitutional challenge, the Court
wrote, "We of course do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to
decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to congressional choice. ' 78 We
could thus characterize the Supreme Court's own description of its
obligation in these circumstances as one of obedience rather than deference. This suggests that, when courts purport to "defer" out of obligation to some higher legal authority, they are mislabeling as acts of
deference what are actually acts of obedience. We thus might want to
be cautious in labeling as deference a judicial act that is required by
the Constitution.
Yet we would quite rightly hesitate to describe the Court's deference to military judgment as an act of obedience. Notwithstanding
the Court's emphatic language in Rostker, the Court's military deference cases do not disclaim its independent authority to interpret the
Constitution even where military judgment is involved; and, as we will
see below, the Court has not rested on the Constitution alone in
describing its decision to defer to militaryjudgments. 79 More broadly,
the Court did not disclaim the possibility that, as an independent
interpreter of the Constitution, it might subsequently reverse itself
and conclude that the Constitution did not require it to defer to the
military. We might thus distinguish between the Supreme Court's
own decision to defer to military officials' judgment, and lower courts'
obligation to obey the Supreme Court and follow suit in deferring.
In short, the line between obedience and deference may be
unclear in particular circumstances, and courts and scholars may err
76 See id. at 515 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[W]hile we have hesitated... to strike
down restrictions on individual liberties which could reasonably be justified as necessary to the military's vital function, we have never abdicated our obligation ofjudicial
review." (citation omitted)).
77 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
78 Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
79 See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
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in describing the courts as engaging in deference on occasions when
they are actually engaging in acts of obedience. Nevertheless, as a
general matter, we may distinguish obedience from deference
because of the quality of independent choice-the choice to disclaim
one's own judgment in favor of another's-that inheres in a proper
act of deference.
An easier distinction is that between deference and discretion.
The discussion so far suggests that an important aspect of deference is
DJ's choice, when confronted with a range of options, to displace its
own judgment with the judgment of D2. That choice is an exercise of
discretion. But a court that declined to defer to the judgment of
another institution, and instead rested on its own independent judgment, would also be exercising its discretion in selecting that option.
So, too, assuming that a variety of conclusions are possible if a court
does exercise independent judgment-if, say, a number of equally
plausible readings of a statute are available to it-then its decision to
adopt one conclusion over another will be an exercise of discretion.
Thus, while the decision to defer is itself an exercise of discretion,
deference is ultimately only a subset of the larger field of discretion.
Again, the distinction could be complicated a little more: once a court
decides on deference as a general ongoing policy, it may seem as if it
is no longer exercising any discretion at all. But the fact that this
choice is available, even if only hypothetically, and the fact that a court
in such a situation would be faced with a number of potential
options-to defer, to refuse to defer, or to select among a variety of
independent judgments of its own-suggests that deference is merely
one outcome among a range of available judicial choices that we properly label as discretion. Deference is a form of discretionary choice,
but is not synonymous with discretion itself.
Finally, we may wish to distinguish between deference and jurisdiction. Assume that Congress stripped the federal courts of their ability to decide cases involving exercises of military judgment. A court
that dismissed for want ofjurisdiction a case raising a question of military judgment could hardly be said to have "deferred" to the military
in that case. This is so for two reasons. First, as I have argued, deference implies some degree of voluntariness, however notional it may
be: D1 only defers to D2 if it might have done otherwise. Second,
deference implies that D1 has some continuing authority to act, and
does act; only its independent judgment is displaced, not its actual
authority. When the Court defers to the military's judgment in a particular case, it does still issue a decision, one that carries with it both
precedential weight and legal force. Critics of the Court's deference
to various institutions have sometimes characterized that deference as
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being so broad that it amounts to a disclaimer of jurisdiction over the
question.80 And in a broader sense of the word, I have argued elsewhere that courts might approach the question of deference to certain "First Amendment institutions" in largely jurisdictional terms, in
which courts would grant these institutions substantial freedom to
develop their own views of the First Amendment within their own
areas of expertise. 8 1 But that is a rather more casual use of the term.
Speaking more precisely, we should be able to distinguish clearly
8 2
between deference and jurisdiction.
B.

Why and When Courts Defer

To recap, we have defined deference as a decisionmaker's decision to follow a determination made by some other individual or institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the
same question independently, and we have drawn some distinctions
between deference and other legal concepts. We now reach the obvious question: why defer? Given the courts' fundamental obligation to
'
"say what the law is,
"3

why should the courts ever defer to the judg-

ments of other decisionmakers? If deference consists of following the
judgment of another even ifone might consider that judgment wrong,
why should courts ever willingly surrender their own independent
84
judgment?
This subpart offers a more detailed account of the reasons courts
give for deferring to others despite the obvious importance of independent judgment to the judicial function. Drawing on terminology
suggested by Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore, I will offer two
broad categories of justification for deference: reasons of legal authority and reasons of epistemic authority. I will thus discuss the reasons for
legal deference and for epistemic deference.8 5 As we will see, these categories are neither watertight nor exclusive. In the same general fieldin cases involving deference to prison authorities, for example-and
80 See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 51, at 819-20 (referring to the Court's deference to
the military as "de facto non-justiciability").
81 See, e.g.,
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1516-23; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
ConstitutionalRights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 147, 188-96 (2003)

(offering an "institutional" theory of rights as rules in which institutions would effectively have jurisdiction over decisions within their own sphere of expertise).
82 See Solove, supra note 32, at 953.
83 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
84 See Scalia, supra note 72, at 513.
85 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 41, at 1271 (distinguishing between "epistemological deference" and "legal deference"); Solum, supra note 41 (distinguishing
between "deference to authority" and "epistemic deference").
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sometimes within the same decision, a court may justify its decision to
defer in terms of both epistemic and legal authority. Moreover, epistemic justifications for deference may shade into legal justifications
for deference, and vice versa. Although these categories are thus not
perfectly distinct, they bring considerable clarity to our understanding
of the courts' justifications for deferring to the determinations of prisons, the military, administrative agencies, schools, and other institutions and individuals.
1. Legal Authority-Based Justifications for Deference
Legal authority-based justifications for deference are fundamentally status-based justifications, which depend for their force on the
86
legal authority of the body to which the courts are deferring.
Because their concern is with the courts' obligations as constitutional
interpreters to follow the interpretations of the political branches,
Lawson and Moore describe legal authority-based deference as deference "that results from the constitutionally-prescribed authoritative
status of the prior interpreter. ' 87 As we will see, however, the statusbased approach captured by the concept of legal deference does not
attach only to determinations made by Congress or the President. It
may also apply in cases involving a host of other public institutions88
and, more surprisingly, in cases involving private institutions as well.
The most prominent legal authority-based justification for deference goes to the heart of our constitutional structure: the separation
of powers. The central example of a separation of powers justification
for legal deference is the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 89 in which the
Court set forth a two-part test for courts engaging in a review of
agency interpretations of law. Under that approach, courts first ask
whether Congress unambiguously addressed the question at issue. 90 If
the statute is ambiguous the court must defer to any "permissible
[agency] construction of the statute." 9 1 The reviewing court's position in such cases is deferential in exactly the way I have defined the
term: the court must follow a permissible agency interpretation of a
statute even if that interpretation is not "the reading the court would
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceed86
87
88
89
90
91

See Lawson & Moore, supra note 41, at 1278.
Id. at 1271.
See Solove, supra note 32, at 944.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843.
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ing." 92

Chevron ushered in an era ofjudicial review of agency interpretations of law that is far more deferential than the Court's prior
93
approach.
For present purposes, of equal significance to the Court's sea
change in its approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of
law is the justification it offered for this newly deferential approach.
Deference to agency interpretations of law was hardly Chevron's invention. But the traditional basis for deference to agency interpretations
rested on the Court's view that agencies often possessed greater exper94
tise on the question at issue than did the generalist federal courts.
95
Chevron noted the old expertise-based rationale for deference.
But
its primary justification for deference to agency interpretations was
based not on expertise, but on the Court's conclusion that Congress
had impliedly delegated its lawmaking power to the agencies. 96 Moreover, it said, agencies are indirectly "accountable to the people"
through the President and it is "entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make [the] policy choices that" are
inherent in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. 97 In short, Chevron "relocated the basis for judicial deference [to agency interpretations of law] from expertise to an implied delegation of lawmaking
power."98 Most scholars have described that move as one sounding in
the separation of powers. 99

The separation of powers justification for legal deference is by no
means limited to administrative law. In constitutional law, the Court
has often employed a similar justification for its deferential review of
actions taken by the political branches. Let us focus on a central
92 Compare id. at 843 n. 11 (following an agency interpretation differing from the
Court's own interpretation), with SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 113 (1978) (rejecting an
agency interpretation that the Court concluded was not the "most natural or
logical").
93 See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 13.7.2, at 476-81 (2d ed. 2001).
94 See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
95 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
96 See id. at 843-44.
97 Id. at 865-66.
98 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 742 (2002).
99 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (3d ed.
2000); Kenneth A. Bamberger, ProvisionalPrecedent: ProtectingFlexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272, 1283-84 (2002); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
456, 466-67 (1989); RandolphJ. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and
Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (2006).
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example of legal authority-based deference that we will encounter
later in discussing FAIR judicial deference in examining legislation
based on Congress' war powers, and in examining decisions made by
military officials themselves. In such cases, the Court has stressed the
Constitution's assignment to Congress of the power to "provide for
the common Defence," "[t]o raise and support Armies," and "[t]o
provide and maintain a Navy." 10 0 The Court has described Congress'
power to make its own determinations in this area as "broad and
sweeping." 10 ' In Rostker, in words later quoted by the Court in FAIR, it
suggested that 'judicial deference . . .is at its apogee" when the fed-

eral courts examine legislation passed pursuant to Congress' authority
02
to establish and maintain the armed forces.
As Diane Mazur has noted, this is an odd justification. In Rostker,
Justice Rehnquist justified the Court's deference to Congress in the
area of military legislation on the grounds that Congress had acted
"under an explicit constitutional grant of authority."' 1 3 But "Congress
1
always acts under an explicit constitutional grant of authority."

04

There is "no indication in the text or structure of the Constitution
that judicial deference to congressional action in military matters
should be any different in scope than judicial deference to congres10 5
sional action in other contexts."
It is thus unclear why the legal authority-based argument for deference should be any stronger for judicial review of congressional
action relating to the military than it is for any other congressional
action. It may seem that the Court, in deferring to Congress' exercise
of its military power, is in effect suggesting that this subject, having
been textually committed to the discretion of another branch, falls
within the scope of the political question doctrine.1 0 6 But, of course,
the Court has not totally disclaimed its authority to scrutinize Con100

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-13; see a/s0Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket

Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2002) (noting the textual basis for the military
system of governance, but arguing that "a purely textualist reading of these provisions
does not establish any special military enclave in which otherwise unconstitutional
measures could be justified to the extent [currently] allowed by the Supreme Court").
101 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
102 453 U.S. 53, 70 (1981), quoted in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l
Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).
103 Id. at 70.
104 Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth
Advance of MartialLaw, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 761 (2002) (emphasis added); see, e.g., United

States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by Congress must be
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.").
105
106

Mazur, supra note 104, at 761 n.350.
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993).
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gress' actions under its military power. 10 7 In any event, we can at least
conclude that the Court's deference to congressional actions arising
under Congress' military power demonstrates that the separation of
powers argument for legal authority-based deference is not limited to
the Chevron doctrine.10 8
A closely related legal authority-based justification forjudicial deference is the argument from democratic legitimacy. We have already
seen that argument at work in Chevron. The Court wrote that, where
the interpretation of ambiguous statutes requires a decisionmaker to
engage in policy choices, the decisionmaker tasked with those choices
should be an agency which is indirectly "accountable to the people"
through the President. 10 9 Sitting in review of such decisions, "federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do."11 0 Thus, beyond the basic textual argument that deference is appropriate where the Constitution
assigns certain tasks to the political branches, the Court also has justified its deference to those branches on the grounds that they are
107 See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67. Critics of the political question doctrine have
long suggested, of course, that the same is true even when the Court does dismiss cases
on political question grounds. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 617-24 (1976).
108 What seems at first blush to be a second form of separation of powers justification forjudicial deference to the military is far more textually rooted in character, but
also much smaller in scope. The Constitution explicitly carves out certain aspects of
military life from its otherwise generally applicable commands. Congress is empowered by Article I to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. That provision must be read together
with the Fifth Amendment, which exempts cases "arising in the land or naval forces"
from the requirement for grandjury indictment or presentation. U.S. CONST. amend.
V. And the Court has held that a military defendant subject to a trial by court-martial
has no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial before a jury "of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Ex
parteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) ("Every one connected with the [military or naval] branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which
Congress has created for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his
right to be tried by the civil courts."). Thus, the Constitution suggests that Congress
may establish a military justice system that is insulated in some respects from the otherwise generally applicable guarantees provided in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
See generally Mazur, supra note 104, at 707-19 (highlighting differences between civilian and military law). Properly regarded, however, this exclusion of military personnel from certain aspects of the Constitution is not so much a basis for deference as it
is a limitation on the federal courts' jurisdiction to entertain such questions.
109 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
110 Id. at 866.
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more closely tied to the mechanisms of political accountability that
legitimize and constrain the policy choices they make.
In addition to the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy forms of legal authority-based judicial deference, there is
another, less conventional form of legal authority-based judicial deference. Consider Parkerv. Levy. 1 1 Levy, an Army doctor serving in the
United States, was convicted by a court-martial under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice on the basis of various remarks he made to
enlisted personnel about his opposition to the war in Vietnam.' 1 2 He
challenged the conviction largely on First Amendment grounds, and
13
the Court upheld his conviction."
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that "[t] his Court has long
recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.""14 The distinction "between the military
community and the civilian community,"1' 15 and the "different character of the military community and of the military mission,"' " 6 he continued, required "a different application of those protections"
7
available under the First Amendment in the military context."1
Accordingly, the Court applied a more deferential standard in reviewing Levy's First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth challenges
than it would have applied in a civilian case."1 8 This line of cases is
known as the "separate community doctrine."' 19 Under this doctrine,
courts give "considerable . . . deference to decisions by Congress or
20
the military" that implicate constitutional rights.'
111
112

417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Id. at 735-40.

113

Id. at 752, 762.

114

Id. at 743. Justice Rehnquist drew primarily on the Court's earlier statement in

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), that "[t]he military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian." Id. at 94. For
an argument that Orloffwas improperly extended in Parker,see Mazur, supra note 104,
at 740-48.
115 Parker,417 U.S. at 749.
116 Id. at 758.
117 Id.
118 See id. at 760-61.
119 James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's ConstitutionalRights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177, 178 (1984).
120 Id. For discussion of the separate community doctrine, see, for example,
Dienes, supra note 51, at 823-27 (criticizing the doctrine); Mazur, supra note 104, at
748-69 (same); Donald N. Zillman & EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, ConstitutionalRights and
Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 396, 401-34
(1976) (same). But see Hirschhorn, supra note 119, at 218-28 (defending the separate community doctrine).
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The separate community doctrine can be viewed as a form of
legal authority-based justification for judicial deference. Although, as
we will see, courts often defer to the military for epistemically based
reasons, the separate community doctrine does not necessarily rest on
the view that the military is possessed of greater knowledge about its
own affairs than courts are likely to have. Rather, it is based literally
on the view that the military is a separate society, "a society apart from
civilian society."'121 Viewed in this light, the Court's deference to the
military can be seen as suggesting that the military occupies a separate
and distinct social sphere into which the courts are forbidden to
enter. We might thus view this aspect of deference to the military as
being, at bottom, legal authority-based, in the sense that the military is
treated as occupying a wholly different social and legal sphere.
The military is not the only institution that has enjoyed some
degree of institutionally oriented legal authority-based deference.
Institutions of higher education have often been treated in similar
terms. Although the justifications courts give for according substantial deference to the decisions of colleges and universities are usually
epistemic in nature,1 22 the upshot is that these institutions are regularly treated as occupying "a special niche in [the] constitutional tradition," in which they enjoy a substantial right of "educational
autonomy." 123 Similarly, in cases involving the freedom of expressive
associations, such as the Court's decision in Dale, the Court indicated
that it will defer to an association's "assertions regarding the nature of
124
its expression" and its "view of what would impair its expression."'
Although the Court's deference to educational institutions and private associations might simply be based on the epistemic argument
that those associations are better qualified to judge such matters than
is the Court itself, something more is arguably at work here. As John
McGinnis has argued, we could think of the Court's decision in Dale
as one that effectively sets aside a "constitutional space" for civil
associations, including public universities and private groups, in which
they enjoy substantial autonomy to shape their own norms. 125 Such a
justification, with its echoes of a "society apart," sounds in legal and
not just epistemic authority.
In sum, we can see a variety of circumstances in which courts
defer to the decisions of other institutions on legal authority-based
121

Parker,417 U.S. at 744.

122 See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
123 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
124 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
125 John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist CourtsJurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 533 (2002).
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grounds, and a variety of reasons why they do so. Courts may justify
legal authority-based deference on separation of powers grounds, or
on the closely related basis that in such cases, D2's decisions possess
greater democratic legitimacy. In a broader sense, a court may defer
on legal authority-based grounds when it treats another institutionwhether a public institution such as the military, or a private association such as the Boy Scouts-as constituting a separate social order
that in some sense lies outside the regular sphere of the courts' decisionmaking process.
2.

Epistemic Authority-Based Justifications for Deference

The second basic justification for judicial deference is not
grounded on the legal authority of the institution to which the courts
defer, but rather on its epistemic authority. Simply put, courts defer to
other institutions when they believe that those institutions know more
than the courts do about some set of issues, such that it makes sense to
allow the views of the knowledgeable authority to substitute for the
courts' ownjudgment. 126 Although the questions raised by the notion
of epistemic deference can be subtle and difficult, 127 we can start at a
more basic level by simply identifying some of the occasions on which
courts will engage in epistemic authority-based deference.
Most commonly, courts defer to other decisionmakers on epistemic grounds when they believe that the other decisionmaker has
greater expertise at its command on the issue in question. This is the
argument from comparative institutional competence, which has
played a significant role in accounts ofjudicial deference since at least
the heyday of the legal process school of jurisprudence. 128 As the
name suggests, when courts defer to other decisionmakers on epistemic grounds related to comparative institutional competence, they
126 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross-Burnings,Epistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. LJ. 575, 610 (2005).

127 For exemplary discussions, see, for example, Brewer, supra note 28, at
1540-96; Hurd, supra note 28, at 1641-66. My colleague Michael Pardo has made a
number of significant recent contributions to the understanding of epistemology in
the law, focusing on evidence law. See Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REv.
119 (2007); Michael S. Pardo, The Field of Evidence and the Field of Knowledge, 24 LAw &
PHIL.

321 (2005).

128 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 3-6
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2d ed. 1994) (introducing the concept of institutional competence); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis
of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1394-402
(1996) (discussing the importance of institutional competence within legal process
jurisprudence).
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are actually doing two things. First, they are suggesting that some
other decisionmaker actually possesses important information, experience, and skills that will help it decide some relevant question correctly. Second, they are suggesting that the other decisionmaker is
not just a good one: it is also a superior decisionmaker, relative to the
court. Thus, epistemic deference on expertise grounds involves both
a positive statement about the abilities of D2 as a decisionmaker, and a
negative statement about the weakness of D1 as a decisionmaker rela129
tive to D2.
Courts regularly invoke this form of reasoning when deferring to
other institutions. Although these reasons can be distinguished from
legal authority-based grounds for deference, courts often defer to the
same institutions for both legal and epistemic authority-based reasons.
Thus, just as they defer to the determinations of administrative agencies for reasons of legal authority, 130 so courts also regularly rely on
the expertise of those agencies in deferring to them. Although, as we
have seen, Chevron suggested that deference to administrative agencies is required primarily because Congress chose to delegate decisionmaking authority to those agencies,13 1 the Court also
acknowledged a long tradition of deferring to agencies because they
possess "'more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."' 3 2 Chevron thus exhibits both the positive and negative aspects of epistemic deference, pointing out not only
that agencies may have "great expertise,"' 33 but also that judges may
"not [be] experts in the field."'13 4
129 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HA v. L. REV. 1274, 1291 (2006).
130 See discussion supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
131
See discussion supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text; see also Michael Herz,
The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 297, 307 n.43 (2004)
(noting that since Chevron the Court has "come to rest the requirement of deference . .. on [the] ... delegation of decisionmaking authority from Congress to the
agency"). But see Note, The Two Faces ofChevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1563 (2007)
(suggesting that many lower courts applying Chevron "have come to rely on agency
expertise in more contexts, and more heavily, in deciding the degree of deference to
provide to agency interpretations than the Supreme Court does").
132 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
133

Id. at 865.

134 Id. (emphasis added); see also Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye:
Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 483-84 (2005) ("Judicial officers have no particular skill in the substantive areas of administrative inquiry
and appellate courts generally lack the institutional ability or resources to make
sound policy decisions according to extensive and complicated factual records.").
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As with administrative agencies, courts regularly defer to the military not only on legal authority grounds, 13 5 but also on the grounds
that the military possesses greater expertise than the courts do on
questions relating to the armed forces. 136 The Supreme Court has
argued that "deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities"' 3 7 is especially important given the "complex, subtle, and
professional" nature of the military's "decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of a military force."' 38 Again, the
courts' deference to the military is not based on the military's expertise alone, but is comparative in nature. The courts are equally certain that they are themselves "'ill-equipped"' to make independent
determinations about various aspects of military life. 139 The Supreme
Court has concluded that "it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which courts have less competence" than the military sphere.

40

Another sphere in which the courts are apt to defer on epistemic
grounds is that of the prison. As with the military, the Court has
stressed that "the problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable,"14' and that running a prison "is an inordinately difficult
undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment
of resources."' 42 Similarly, the Court has suggested that decisions with
respect to prison security are "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials.'143 Accordingly, and in
order "[t] o ensure that courts accord appropriate deference to prison
officials,"144 the Court has directed courts considering inmates' constitutional challenges to apply a deferential standard of review, asking
whether the challenged prison regulation is "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.'

45

135 See discussion supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 129, at 1300-01 (noting the appearance of both
legal and epistemic arguments for judicial deference to the military in the Court's
opinions); Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference,
Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 376-77 (1995) (same).
137 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
138 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
139 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962)).

140 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10.
141 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
142 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
143 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
144 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
145 Turner,482 U.S. at 89; see also Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579-80 (2006)
(applying Turner in upholding a prison policy restricting access to newspapers,
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Another area in which epistemic authority-based arguments for
deference are regularly employed by the federal courts involves education. At both the K-12 level of public education and the university
level, courts regularly justify substantial judicial deference by appealing to the expertise of educators. At the public school level, while the
Supreme Court has stated that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,"1 46 the Court has subsequently laid greater emphasis on the view
that any such First Amendment rights must be "applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment," 14 7 and that judgments regarding the needs of educators in that environment rest in
the first instance with the educators themselves. 148 Thus, federal
courts have "granted [public school] educators substantial deference"
in weighing the appropriateness of school actions with respect to student speech.

149

Similarly, the courts have regularly cited the expertise of universities in deferring to educational judgments made by those institutions.
For example, in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,150 Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, observed that the federal courts are
poorly suited to "evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions-decisions that require an 'expert evaluation of
cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedu5 1
ral tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.'"
The federal courts have accordingly given substantial deference
to "a university's academic decisions"' 52 across a range of issues. Most
famously, in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,153 Justice Frankfurter argued that universities are entitled to deference with
magazines, and photographs for inmates in a highly restricted level of a prison's longterm segregation unit); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91 (setting out four factors to be analyzed in "determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue"). But seeJohnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-11 (2005) (declining to apply the Turner standard to a

prison policy that temporarily separated inmates by race and national origin).
146 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986).
149 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
150 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
151 Id. at 226 (quoting Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78, 90 (1978)).
152 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
153 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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respect to academic decisions concerning "the four essential freedoms
of a university-to determine.. . who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 154 This
deference to university officials underlay the Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,155 upholding the affirmative action program of the University of Michigan Law School, in part on the basis of the deference
due to "complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily
15 6
within the expertise of the university."
Finally, courts often defer to a wide range of private institutions,
as opposed to the primarily public institutions we have considered so
far. The most prominent recent example is, of course, the deference
to expressive associations exhibited by the Supreme Court in its decision in Dale.157 Here, the Court made it clear that in evaluating First
Amendment claims by expressive associations, it will defer to "an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression," and to its
"view of what would impair its expression.

'158

The Court did not explain precisely why expressive associations
are entitled to this level of deference, but we might view deference to
expressive associations as another form of epistemically grounded
judicial deference. The sheer variety of expressive associations, and
the complex balance of intergroup relations and outward expressive
goals that characterizes each association, may simply overwhelm the
courts' ability to make useful judgments about the nature of particular
expressive enterprises. Thus, we might see the Court's willingness to
accept at face value the claims of expressive associations, as in Dale, as
an acknowledgement that courts are epistemically ill-suited to make
independent determinations about the nature of expressive associations, or the circumstances in which an expressive association's ability
to express its views would be impaired. In this sense, the courts' deference to expressive associations is simply a larger example of a conclusion drawn long ago by James Madison with respect to religious
154 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
155 539 U.S. 306.
156 Id. at 328. For a critique of judicial deference to universities, with specific
reference to employment decisions, see Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference":
How Recent Developments in Employment DiscriminationLaw Undercut an Already Dubious
Doctrine, 27 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10-19 (2006). For a broader critique of the
courts' use of deference in particular institutional contexts, see generally Scott A.
Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive
Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635, 1670-78
(2007).
157 See infra Part IJI.B.
158 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
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associations in particular: "the Civil Magistrate is [not] a competent
judge" of such organizations.

15 9

These examples barely begin to describe the broad spectrum of
institutions to which the courts will accord epistemically based judicial
deference. As Professor Solove notes, one could easily add government health institutions, government employers, and various actors
within the criminal justice system to the list, along with "practically any
other decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise."' 160 But
they will serve for now to illustrate the breadth of institutions to which
the courts will grant some degree of deference based on the superior
epistemic authority of those institutions relative to the courts.
3.

Error Costs: Fusing the Legal and Epistemic Authority
Justifications for Judicial Deference

The last two sections have offered two broad sets of justifications
regularly relied on by courts in according deference to the claims of
various organizations or institutions. First, courts will defer to particular institutions where they are convinced those institutions possess
superior legal authority relative to the deciding court. Second, courts
are inclined to defer to institutions when they believe those institutions are blessed with a superior expertise within some particular area
of knowledge-in other words, when those institutions possess a superior epistemic authority relative to the deciding court.
The discussion so far raises two important questions. First, why
do the courts defer on epistemic grounds only to particular institutions? After all, the federal courts regularly, and without any hint of
deference, review and resolve problems of the most exquisite complexity. 16 1 Indeed, apart from narrow questions of law, there is no
issue on which a court might not properly be said to be an inferior
epistemic authority. Why, then, defer on epistemic grounds in some
cases and not in virtually all cases? Second, why do courts so often
defer for reasons of both legal and epistemic authority?
159 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 23-24 (2000) (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Relig-

ious Assessments, in 5

THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITuTION

82, 83 (Philip Kurland & Ralph

Lerner eds., 1987)).
160 Solove, supra note 32, at 961.
161
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Casey Martin, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 267, 278-88 (noting that "it is (possibly) too late in
the day to suggest that courts should be limited in their jurisdiction to topics about
which the judges . . .have antecedent and genuine expertise" and that examples of
deference are "best thought of as the exceptions and not the rule").

2008]

THREE FACES OF DEFERENCE

1o91

One possible answer to the first question lies in a consideration of
error costs. A widely recognized view of the judicial task holds that
courts, in framing decision rules, seek "to minimize the sum of error
costs and administrative costs."'

62

That is, courts will seek some deci-

sion rule by which they can minimize both the costs of erroneous decisions, "discounted by the respective probabilities of those errors," and
163
the administrative costs "of operating under the rule in question."'
Thus, one reason why courts might defer in cases involving particular institutions and not others is that the courts, drawing on long
experience, conclude that a deferential posture with respect to certain
institutions is justified because deference in those instances minimizes
the sum of error costs and administrative costs. To take an example, a
court might conclude that, in the common run of cases, prison
administrators are less likely to err in making particular decisions
within the sphere of their expertise than are courts. Moreover, the
court might conclude that a rule favoring general deference to prison
administrators is less costly than one requiring careful case-by-case
review by courts, in light of the courts' inexpertness relative to the
expertise of many prison administrators.
In short, a court might conclude that, as to particular institutions,
a general rule of deference might minimize the sum of error costs and
administrative costs. In other cases, a court might conclude that an
institution is as likely as-or more likely than-a court to err in making its own decisions, and that the administrative costs of more searching judicial review of that institution's decisions are not particularly
high. Thus, a rule of deference would not satisfy the court's desire to
minimize either error costs or administrative costs. And in some middle category of cases, a court might conclude that although another
institution is epistemically superior to the court, it is not so epistemically superior, and the administrative costs of more probing review are
not so great, as to justify a general rule of deference.

162 David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 193
(1988); see also, e.g., Fallon, supra note 129, at 1310-12 ("On another interpretation,
the judicially manageable standard... would be that which would produce the greatest possible proportion of correct outcomes . . . over the total range of cases to be
decided by courts."); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REv. 1649, 1661-63 (2005) (discussing "costs of
error" as a factor in the construction of constitutional decision rules); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885, 933,
936 (2003) (arguing that the risk ofjudicial error is a relevant factor in any institutionally sensitive account of constitutional interpretation).
163 Strauss, supra note 162, at 193 n.12.
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This argument seems to justify approaching particular institutions, and not others, with a presumptive rule of deference. But it
does not entirely answer the question I posed above. In particular, it
does not answer the question of why the courts generally defer to the
institutions that they actually do defer to-prisons, the military, educational institutions-and not others. Courts do not, for example, show
any special degree of deference to decisions made by the aeronautics
industry. 1 64 Yet is it really more likely that the sum of error and
administrative costs will be lower with respect to cases involving aeronautics than they are with respect to decisions made by universitiesan institution with which judges have at least a passing acquaintance?
The answer to this question lies in a deeper understanding of the
nature of error costs in the context ofjudicial review. Although courts
often defer because they are convinced another institution is more
likely to reach the right answer on some question outside the expertise
of the courts, 16 5 the courts sometimes are even more concerned that
they may reach the wrong answer if they do not defer to particular
institutions, and that wrong answers can be especially hazardous in
particular cases. As Professor Fallon observes, "[S] ome kinds of errors
are more serious than others."' 6 6 Costly errors can take at least two
forms. First, a court might be concerned that the real-world effects of
judicial error might be so grave as to counsel in favor of deference to
a more expert decisionmaker. This fear that the "consequences of
judicial error" might be "uniquely serious" supports judicial deference
in favor of the military, given the potential "cost in lives and material"
involved. 16 7 Second, courts may believe that in certain contexts,
nondeferential judicial review is likely to result in the underprotection
of essential constitutional rights. 1 68 For example, a court may believe
that deferring to an expressive association's own "view of what would
164

In a different sense, of course, such cases will be subject to a certain kind of

deference at the appellate level: the reviewing court will defer to the findings made by
the trier of fact with respect to any relevant facts in dispute concerning, say, the aeronautics industry. But this is a form of deference to the lower court, not to the industry
in question.
165 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 32, at 1004-06.
166 Fallon, supra note 129, at 1311.

167 Hirschhorn, supra note 119, at 238-39; see also Fallon, supra note 129, at
1311-12 ("The Court may therefore believe it appropriate to craft doctrinal tests not
merely to maximize the number of cases that courts decide correctly, but to minimize
the number of decisions that occasion severe harm.").
168 Of course, in other contexts, courts may refuse to defer precisely because they
believe that a failure to engage in searching judicial review will result in the violation
of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-15 (2005)
(determining that strict scrutiny, rather than deferential reasonableness review,
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impair its expression" 169 minimizes the risk that a court will underprotect expressive associational rights.
These reasons lead to a further insight. Although there are
important distinctions between legal authority-based and epistemic
authority-based arguments for judicial deference, often the two will
fuse into one. 170 The court may conclude that, in those areas in
which the real-world costs of error are likely to be especially grave, the
Constitution has, not coincidentally, conferred legal authority on an
institution that is also especially likely to have greater epistemic authority in this area.
Similarly, as I argue at greater length below, 171 the courts often
recognize that particular institutions are especially vital to the maintenance of certain constitutional freedoms, and, more broadly, that
these institutions play a central role in our public life. 172 Accordingly,
it may well accord these institutions a greater measure of deference,
in recognition of both the epistemic authority such an institution is
likely to develop over time, and the legal authority it enjoys under the
Constitution as an independent and autonomous public institution.
For example, the courts may recognize that the press serves a vital
social function in monitoring the conduct of political officials1 7 3 and
encouraging public discourse by private citizens,1 74 and that it has
long enjoyed the kind of autonomous legal status that continues to
justify deferring to decisions made by journalists and editors 1 75 Similarly, the courts may believe that religious institutions are epistemi1 76
cally superior to courts in judging threats to their own freedom,
applied to a prisoner's claims that racial classification in the penal system violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
169 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
170 See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 41, at 1278 (noting that
"[e]pistemological deference can often shade into legal deference").
171 See infra Parts III.B-D.
172 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L.
REv. 907, 925 (2006) ("An institutional understanding of the First Amendment is
structured around the principle that certain institutions play special roles in serving
the kinds of values that the First Amendment is most plausibly understood to
protect.").
173 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theoly, 1977 Am. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 527 (noting "the value that free speech, a free press, and free
assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials").
174 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 678 (1991) (Souter,J., dissenting) ("[Freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing
[public] discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self-governed.").
175 See Bezanson, supra note 25, at 758-60; Horwitz, Blog, supra note 8, at 48-51.
176

See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 159, 24-25.
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and also that these institutions are, under our Constitution, peculiarly
177
deserving of a substantial measure of decisionmaking autonomy.
Thus, it is not surprising thatjudicial deference to particular institutions will often rest on a mixed ground of both legal and epistemic
authority. Nor is it surprising that courts have regularly deferred to
particular institutions on epistemic grounds, while refusing to defer to
other institutions whose affairs raise equally factually difficult questions. In the courts' view, some institutions partake of some form of
both legal and epistemic authority, and are especially deserving of
judicial deference. Other institutions do not rise to this level and will
receive less deference from courts, which will be more willing to muddle through in such cases.
C. Some Conclusions and Questions About Deference
The taxonomy of deference I have offered thus far allows us to
begin drawing some conclusions about the Court's use of deference as
a general device in constitutional law. It also raises a number of difficult questions. The questions raised here will outnumber the answers
I offer. Even so, we may emerge from this discussion in a position that
enables us to reach some deeper conclusions about both the FAIR
case and its broader implications for First Amendment doctrine, while
leaving some questions open for future inquiry.
The first conclusion we may reach is that deference is pervasive as
a jurisprudential device in constitutional law. To take only the examples offered above, judicial deference is relevant to, at the very least,
questions concerning administrative law, military law, prisoners'
rights, and First Amendment rights in and around public schools, universities, the press, religious associations, and a broad array of other
expressive associations.
177 See, e.g.,
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1510 ("By deferring ... courts offer ...
institutions substantial autonomy to act in ways that may conform poorly to the general doctrinal structures maintained by courts, but that make complete sense in light
of the needs and functions of particular institutions and their superior ability to assess
the relevant facts."); see also Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4J. CATH.
Soc. THOUGHT 59, 73-81 (2006) (arguing that "[r]eligious freedom, which includes
necessarily the freedom of the Church, is a good to be promoted, and not merely the
result of, or what is left over after, government neutrality or incompetcnce"); Richard
W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 528-33 (2007) (discussing religious institutions as
First Amendment institutions); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of
Religious Entities in Our ConstitutionalOrder, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002) (examining
competing views of religious institutional autonomy and concluding that "[I] ife's ultimate questions are to be left in private hands, and when those hands are institutional,
the state must respect the internal life and self-governance of such institutions").
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Indeed, by focusing on cases in which the federal courts have
deferred explicitly to other formal or informal institutions, I have
vastly understated the true scope of deference as a common feature in
constitutional law. I have not considered, for example, the degree to
which deference pervades the courts' review of actions taken by the
players in the criminal justice system, including prosecutors, criminal
defense attorneys, and police officers. 178 Similarly, I have not considered the degree to which deference figures heavily in the Supreme
179
Court's review of factual determinations made by lower courts.
More broadly, my focus on the explicit use of deference by the
courts in cases involving epistemically or legally superior institutions
sets aside the process of judicial review in most other constitutional
cases, with its spectrum of analysis running from rational basis scrutiny
to strict scrutiny-all of which involve degrees of deference to government actors.' 80 Even in the limited, institutionally oriented areas I
have explored, however, the pervasiveness of deference as a method
of judicial weighting in constitutional law is quite apparent.
For all its pervasiveness, however, the second conclusion we may
reach is that deference remains curiously undertheorized and misunderstood by the federal courts. As Justice Thurgood Marshall once
complained, the Court's pronouncements about deference often
amount to nothing more than the mouthing of "hollow shibboleths" 181 : rote invocations unsupported by explanation or justification
beyond a cite to an equally undertheorized prior precedent. Why
does the Supreme Court, when it employs deference, sometimes
invoke the legal authority of the decisionmaker to whom it is deferring, and why does it sometimes invoke instead the other institution's
178 See generally Solove, supra note 32, at 963-64 (showing that "ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed with great deference" and that reviews of
.prosecutorial decisions . . . are highly deferential").
179 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078 (2006) ("Deference is given to a
trial court's assessment of evidence presented to it in the first instance."); Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (arguing on epistemic grounds for deference to a
trial court's findings concerning the presence or absence of discriminatory intent in
the use of peremptory challenges). For an extensive treatment of appellate standards
of review, see generally HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIoTr, FEDERAL COURTSSTANDARDS OF REvIEW

19-183 (2007).

180 For superb recent treatments of the Court's use of tiers of scrutiny in judicial
review, including pertinent discussions of deference, see, for example, Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1285-90 (2007); G. Edward
White, HistoricizingJudicialScrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REv. 1, 65-83 (2005); Adam Winkler,
Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 798-833 (2006).
181 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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epistemic authority? Why defer to some institutions, on either or both
grounds, and not others? Why does the Court sometimes invoke the
epistemic authority-based justification for judicial deference when, in
fact, the Court is not relying on the relevant expertise of that body in
the case at hand? 182 Is judicial deference properly limited to the factual determinations of the deferred-to body, or should courts defer as
well to legal or mixed factual and legal determinations made by the
other body?' 8 3 If so, why should courts ever defer to the legal determinations of other bodies? And why do courts defer to legal determinations in some areas but not others?1 8 4 The courts have offered few
clear answers to these nettlesome questions.
Although this Article may supply tentative answers to some of
these questions, many will remain unanswered here. Still, this Article
may contribute to a better understanding of the use of deference in
constitutional law in two ways. First, this Article's description of the
legal and epistemic authority justifications for judicial deference at
least points the way to a clearer understanding of the occasions and
arguments for judicial deference, and helps provide a starting point
for anyone seeking to explore the larger puzzles posed by this phenomenon. Second, as we will see, this Article's attempt to cash out its
basic taxonomy of deference in the more concrete surroundings of
the FAIR litigation sheds some light on how these questions arise in
the actual practice of the courts.
These lingering questions give rise to a third broad line of
inquiry: how the Court knows whether, and how much, to defer to
other institutions. We might divide this into two separate questions:
how the Court knows whether to defer on legal authority-based
182 For example, in Rostker, the Court noted that "'[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments"' worthy of substantial
judicial deference. Id. at 65-66 (majority opinion) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). But the judgment in that case concerned deference to Congress'
determination that women should not be subject to the draft; the military-the superior epistemic authority in that case-actually favored the inclusion of women in the
draft. See, e.g., id. at 84-85 (White,J., dissenting); Mazur, supra note 49, at 488. For a
similar argumcnt in the context of the FAIR decision, see infra notes 318-19 and
accompanying text.
183 For a discussion of the law-fact distinction, see sources cited supra note 63.
184 See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 104, at 761 (noting that the legal authority-based
justification for judicial deference to Congress in the exercise of its military and war
powers applies equally to Congress' exercise of its other Article I, Section 8 powers,
although courts do not necessarily defer to legal determinations made by Congress in
those areas).
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grounds, and how it knows whether to defer on epistemic authoritybased grounds. In both cases, the answer is surprisingly unclear.
In one sense, deference on legal authority-based grounds seems
simple enough: where the Constitution confers decisionmaking
authority on another body-Congress, the executive branch, or even
some private institution-the Court defers, and that is the end of the
matter. This is the core of a number of familiar constitutional doctrines, some of which have already been mentioned above: the political question doctrine, 18 5 the enrolled bill doctrine, 186 Chevron
deference, 87 the rational basis test introduced by the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,18 8 the Court's substantial (but, seemingly, shrinking)
deference to Congress' exercise of its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 89 and so on.
The problem here is that the Constitution rarely, if ever, speaks
in a clear or direct voice about the necessity, propriety, or degree of
deference required when the federal courts review the actions of
other legal authorities. 9 0 It is true, for example, that the Constitution
assigns responsibility for the lawmaking process to the legislative and
executive branches, and so the enrolled bill doctrine may be seen as a
reasonable recognition of this conferral of legal authority. But nothing in the Constitution requires the courts to refrain from examining
closely whether the political branches have, in fact, met the constitutional requirements for lawmaking in a given case. And yet it is well
accepted that courts will not do so.1 91 Nor does the Constitution itself
185 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993).
186 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-79 (1892).
187 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
188 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
189 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (setting a deferential standard forjudicial review of congressional exercise of power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment); cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20
(1997) (refusing to defer to "substantive" exercises of the Section 5 enforcement
power). This position has been subject to criticism. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2020-23 (2003); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitutionfrom the People:JuricentricRestrictions on Section
Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 17-30 (2003).
190 See Monaghan, supra note 57, at 9 ("To be sure, this commitment-to-anotherbranch rationale
[for judicial deference]
necessitates some judicial
interpretation .... ).
191 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (rejecting a challenge to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 which argued that
the bill presented to the President had not passed both chambers with identical

language).
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tell us in so many words why courts ought to defer on such questions
as whether a bill has passed both houses of Congress in identical form,
but not on matters that are arguably equally committed to Congress
or the executive branch; why, for example, courts defer substantially
to Congress where it exercises its lawmaking powers under the Commerce Clause, but not where it exercises its lawmaking authority in a
way that implicates the Bill of Rights. 192 In short, however sound the
legal authority-based justification for judicial deference may be, it
does not offer clear guidance as to the occasions on which judicial
deference is required or appropriate.
The question of when courts are obliged to defer to other institutions grows still more difficult when we turn to epistemic justifications
for judicial deference. As Scott Brewer has observed in a somewhat
different context, 19 3 this is a peculiarly vexing question in at least two
ways, the second of which will be especially relevant when we turn to
the Court's decision in FAIR First, there is a foundational problem: if
the premise of an epistemic justification for judicial deference is that
deference is appropriate where some other institution has more
expertise than the courts do, how do courts-which are, by hypothesis, unqualified or underqualified to make judgments about this
area-know when this condition applies? In other words, even if
courts are well aware of what they do not know, how can they tell that
some other institution in fact knows more than them? If the basis for
epistemic deference is that the courts are relatively ignorant, then
how can the courts determine in a nonarbitrary way that some other
institution is relatively knowledgeable?
We might respond on practical and intuitive grounds that such
complaints are "too quick, too cheap, too thin." 194 Judges may not
know much about engineering, but they understand that some individuals or institutions know considerably more about engineering
than they do. But this leads to a second problem. It is true that courts
usually confront situations in which there is only one claimant invoking an entitlement to deference, so that the question is a simple
binary one of whether or not to defer to the institution, and specifically whether that institution is epistemically superior to the court.
But this is not always the case. In cases involving scientific expertise,
192 The canonical citation is, of course, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
193 See generally Brewer, supra note 28, at 1540-96, 1634-71 (analyzing the epistemic justifications for judicial deference as it relates to scientific expert testimony).
194 Id. at 1630 (addressing potential responses to the argument that focusing on
expert credentials does not provide an "epistemically legitimate method" for judges
weighing the selection of experts).
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for example, courts often face competing experts "who testify to contrary or even contradictory scientific propositions." 95 The question
then is which of these competing experts the court will defer to with
respect to the relevant factual questions before it. In such cases,
courts must select between competing epistemic authorities in precisely those cases in which, by hypothesis, the courts are least qualified
to make such a selection on epistemically justified grounds. Thus,
courts may well be incapable of choosing between these competing
1
claimants "in an epistemically nonarbitrary way."

96

The same question confronts us in a somewhat different form
even outside the realm of expert scientific knowledge. For the deference question is not always a binary one, even in cases in which the
courts face epistemically superior institutions, such as Congress, prisons, and the other institutions I have already canvassed, rather than
individual scientific experts. As we will see, FAIR isjust such a case. In
that case, the Supreme Court faced at least two competing claims to
deference, from institutions that were both ostensibly epistemically
superior to the Court itself: Congress and the law schools.1 97 Thus,
the question before it was not simply whether to defer to some epistemically superior authority, but which institution should win the competition for deference.
One partial answer to the dilemma of how courts are to know
whether and when to defer lies within the shared space between legal
and epistemic authority that we saw earlier. That is the notion that
the courts ought especially to defer in cases involving institutions that
are not only epistemically superior, but that also have particular significance in our constitutional and social order. Whatever arguments
might be made for deference in the common run of cases, some cases
involve institutions that are of special importance to the constitutional
order, and that are, to some extent, singled out as important by the
Constitution itself. Thus, I have argued elsewhere that a number of
institutions-the press, universities, religious institutions, libraries,
195 Id. at 1538.
196 Id. at 1680.
197 In fact, the number of competing claims to deference in FAIR proliferate still
further. We might argue that the Court faced the question whether to defer on epistemic grounds to Congress in its exercise of its authority over the military, or whether
this claim to deference was undermined by the fact that the military itself apparently
took a different view of the necessity of the Solomon Amendment. See infra notes
318-19 and accompanying text. We might also further subdivide the law schools'
claims to deference into two forms of deference: deference to the schools as expressive associations, and deference to the schools as educational institutions. See infra
Part III.B-C.
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and perhaps a few others-are of "special importance to public discourse."1 9 8 These institutions are singled out not only by their fundamental role in preserving and furthering public discourse, but also by
their very institutional nature: by the fact that they have a store of
expertise and a long tradition of norms, practices, and traditions that
enable them to function productively as self-governing institutions.
We can thus supply a tentative answer to the question of how
courts should know when and whether to defer to particular institutions: courts ought especially to defer when they confront a claim to
deference made by an institution of particular importance in our constitutional and social structure, one whose expertise and whose constitutional importance both counsel in favor of judicial abstention. 199
And in cases in which the Court faces competing claims to deference
from two or more institutions, and in which the competing institutions all possess more or less equal measures of epistemic and/or legal
authority, it ought to put a thumb on the scale of the institution that
is, in the Court's judgment, the most constitutionally significant.
It bears emphasis that this is only a partial answer. It does not, for
example, answer Professor Brewer's question: how, given their epistemic weakness, are courts to select among competing claims to deference? 200 And it raises a further difficult question: how are courts to
weigh competing claims to deference in cases in which more than one
institution is constitutionally significant, where it is not evident that
one institution is more significant than the rest? As we will see, FAIR
is just such a case. Notwithstanding these questions, however, placing
the focus on the constitutional significance of deferred-to institutions
may at least represent a step forward in our understanding of
deference.

198 Horwitz, supra note 4, at 571.
199 Incidentally, this answer may help us understand why courts sometimes defer
to institutions that they actually understand reasonably well, and why they do not
always defer to institutions that they understand less well: because of the greater constitutional and social importance of some of the institutions in the former category.
For example, courts defer to universities, with which all judges have substantial personal experience, but do not defer substantially on the question of the nature of the
game of golf-a question as to which the current Court, at least, has no special expertise, but one that only a few duffers would find constitutionally significant. Compare
Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/CompellingInstitutions: Law Schools as Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1621-22 (2007) (law schools), with Schauer,
supra note 161, at 274-76 (professional golf).
200 See Brewer, supra note 28, at 1590-96.
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The Reciprocal Obligations of Deferred-to Institutions

One last significant issue remains to be discussed in this Part's
attempt to impose some clarity and order on the use of deference in
constitutional law. Thus far, our examination of deference has proceeded from the standpoint of the institution that defers-namely,
the judiciary. Focusing on the deferring party is common in the constitutional literature on deference. But there is another standpoint
worth considering, and it is much more rarely discussed: that of the
party to which deference is owed (D2, as I have labeled it, or the
"deferee"). 201 Let us assume a situation in which judicial deference to
a party or institution is required. In such circumstances, we know that
the court owes deference to the deferee. But what obligations does
the deferee, in turn, owe to the court? This question is surely central
to the concept of deference, but is often neglected. Here, I set out
some qualities that might characterize the obligations of the deferee,
under both the legal and epistemic authority justifications for deference. The distinction between these bases for deference is unlikely to
be of great importance here, as the obligations of the deferee are similar in both cases. Nevertheless, I will take them seperately.
Under an epistemically based rule of deference, a party that
invokes deference should display a number of qualities. First and
most obviously, to the extent that judicial deference to such an institution is based on its epistemic superiority, we should oblige such an
institution to actually bring the weight of its expertise to bear on the
problem before the court. Conversely, a party invoking its epistemic
authority as a basis for judicial deference ought not invoke that
20 2
authority on questions that are beyond the scope of its expertise.
Second, we might expect a party that invokes deference to reason
in goodfaith on those questions that will be the subject of the judicial
act of deference. 20 3 As Schauer observes, to the extent that the obligations of the deferee partake of a moral character, the deferee "would
not want to put another person ...

in the position of having to defer

to a decision that he .. .thinks [is] wrong" 20 4 by invoking deference
201 See Schauer, supra note 53, at 1574.
202 Cf Charles, supra note 126, at 613 ("The fact that one may defer to the epistemic authority of someone in regard to one subject matter does not necessarily mean
that one defers to her on all subject matters. Ascertaining the contexts, domains, or
subject matters that command epistemic deference is part of the inquiry into epistemic authority.").
203 See SOPER, supra note 28, at 182 ("Deference requires good faith on the part of
the [deferee].").
204 Schauer, supra note 53, at 1574.
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without engaging in good-faith deliberation on the question at
20 5
hand.
Third, we might expect a deferee to reason thoughtfully toward its
conclusions. A conclusion that is reached in haste, or carelessly, or
without serious consideration of the complexity of the question, is
hardly one that partakes of the quality of epistemic authority that is
the basis for judicial deference.
Finally, we might expect a deferee to meet not just a set of substantive obligations when it invokes deference, but also to observe a
minimum level of appropriate process in its deliberations. To the
extent that it demands deference for its deliberations, those deliberations should be sufficiently structured and transparent to earn the
trust of the deferring institution, and the deferee should take some
pains to explain its reasons and its process in a way that provides a
similar assurance that its conclusions are the result of a meaningful,
20 6
full, and fair exercise of its expertise.
The qualities we should expect from a faithful deferee will be the
same if we shift the ground from the epistemic justification for judicial
deference to the legal authority-based justification. If the courts are
to defer to some institution because it possesses the sole or superior
legal authority to decide in that area, we should expect that institution
to seek deference only where its conclusions actually fall within the
proper scope of its legal authority. To take an exaggerated example,
deference to Congress on the basis of its postal powers would not be
justified in the case of legislation dealing with some matter lying
outside the proper scope of that power-say, an appropriation for the
Department of Defense.
The qualities we might expect from a deferee whose exercise of
its legal authority is worthy of judicial deference are also likely to line
up closely with the qualities addressed above. After all, one of the
foundations of legal authority-based deference is that the Constitution
has equipped the political branches with a variety of mechanisms to
ensure sound, legitimate, and accountable decisionmaking. These
include open, extended, and transparent deliberation, and a mean;ngful opportunity to air opposing viewpoints. Thus, just as we saw
205

Cf Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13

COR-

NELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (2004) (examining and defending cases in which courts

have refused to accord full Chevron deference to instances of "self-interested agency
action").
206 Cf Joseph Vining, Authority and Responsibility: The Jurisprudenceof Deference, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 140 (1991) ("[Courts] regularly demand, and condition their
deference upon, evidence that the agency has in fact responsibly considered the question fully and on the merits.").
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that legal authority-based justifications for deference often shade into
epistemic justifications for deference, so, too, the obligations of deferees are likely to be the same under both accounts of deference.
This discussion of the obligations of the deferee corresponds
fairly closely to the current state of administrative law. As we have
seen, since Chevron the primary basis for judicial deference to agency
interpretations of law has been legal authority rather than epistemic
authority: courts defer because of the political status of administrative
agencies rather than their expertise. But recent cases have made clear
that this is not the whole story.
In United States v. Mead Corp., 20 7 for example, the Court discussed
the proper occasions for Chevron deference. 20 8 Relying on the legal
authority justification offered by the Court in Chevron itself, the Court
held that Chevron deference is appropriate "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."20 9 What
this means in practice is that Chevron deference is most clearly appropriate where an agency is acting under a congressionally mandated
"formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force." 2 10
As Richard Murphy has observed, this statement draws on both legal
and epistemic authority-based justifications for deference:
"' [R] elatively formal administrative procedures' ... encourage 'deliberation' (and thus the deployment of expertise) and 'fairness' (transparency and political accountability). "211 In short, the Court's ruling
in Mead suggests that judicial deference is most fitting where an
administrative agency is operating squarely within the terms of a properly delegated legal authority and operating according to a process
that best ensures the sound application of its epistemic authority.
Similarly, in a case decided a year before Mead, Christensen v. Harris County,2 1 2 the Court declined to apply Chevron deference to an
agency interpretation of a statute contained in an agency opinion letter, contrasting agency statements of this kind with "formal adjudication[s] or notice-and-comment rulemaking." 213 While Christensen was
207 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
208 See id. at 226-31.
209 Id. at 226-27.
210 Id. at 229-30.
211 Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1247, 1290 (first
alteration in original) (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 230).
212 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
213 Id. at 586-87.
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ostensibly decided on standard post-Chevron legal authority grounds,
the opinion also evokes the kinds of process rules that I have suggested must be observed by a faithful deferee, since informal statements such as opinion letters "may or may not reflect the careful
214
application of agency expertise."
Concerns about the obligations of the deferee can also be found
in a variety of the subfields of constitutional law discussed earlier in
this Article. Higher education law supplies a prominent example.
Although courts regularly defer to the academic decisions of universities, 2 15 they are far less likely to do so where a university has failed to
support its decision adequately with thoughtful deliberation carried
out according to some reasonable process. An example of this is
Guckenberger v. Boston University,2 16 a case involving a claim against Boston University under the Americans with Disabilities Act, in which
some students argued that they should be exempt from foreign-language requirements. The district court refused to dismiss the action
because the university administration had not "engage [d] in any form
of 'reasoned deliberation as to whether modifications [in the foreign
language requirement] would change the essential academic standards of [the university's] liberal arts curriculum.' ' 2 17 On remand,
after the university demonstrated that it had engaged in subsequent
good-faith deliberation on the issue, the court deferred to the univer218
sity's insistence that the requirement was essential to the program.
Although this focus on the obligations of the deferee appears in
the case law dealing with potential deferees, it is somewhat less well
attended to in constitutional scholarship itself. Even here, however,
we may find echoes of this concern. Laurence Tribe's model of substantive due process as a form of "allocation of competences," 21 9 for
example, could be seen as being grounded in a consideration of the
214 Krotoszynski, supra note 98, at 745 (citingJim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105,
1144-46 (2001)).
215 See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) ("[C]ourts have
stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments."); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (deferring
substantially to an academic decision to dismiss a student where the University reason-

ably exercised professional judgment according to "accepted academic norms").
216 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998).
217 Id. at 85 (quoting Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 149 (D.
Mass. 1997)).
218 See id. at 90.
219 Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1973).
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proper deference relationship between different public and private
220
decisionmakers.
Two conclusions are in order here. First, although both courts
and scholars have examined the obligations of the deferee, most of
them have done so from the standpoint of the deferrer-generally, the
reviewing court. 22 1 That focus is understandable, but we ought not to

think about the obligations of the deferee strictly in terms of what is
acceptable to the deferrer. If we are to think of the deferee as having
a kind of moral responsibility to take seriously its privileged status as a
subject of deference, 2 22 we ought to give proper consideration to the
obligations of the deferee for its own sake, and not simply as a matter
of predicting whether or not the courts will defer in particular circumstances. After all, the courts are not the only realm in which we might
exert pressure on deferees to earn the deference they invoke. Thus,
as we will see below, even if the Court ought to have deferred to the
law school plaintiffs in FAIR, the plaintiffs might still be criticized
from within the legal academic community itself for the conclusions
they drew about their mission as academic institutions.
Second, in considering the obligations of the deferee we may find
another piece of the answer to the question of how courts should
approach cases in which they face competing claims to deference
from two or more institutions. 223 Even if more than one institution
before the reviewing court is usually entitled to deference, and even if
more than one of those institutions is constitutionally significant in
some sense, not all such institutions are equally deserving of deference on every occasion. Courts may face competing claims of deference in which one of the institutions seeking judicial deference has
failed to deliberate fully and transparently on the question as to which
it seeks deference, or has reached a conclusion that falls beyond the
usual scope of its legal or epistemic authority. In such circumstances,
that institution has not necessarily honored its own obligations as a
would-be deferee, and a court may properly accord it less deference
than it does to the competing institution.
E. Summary
Given the extensive nature of the discussion so far, a brief summary is in order. I have suggested that deference is both pervasive
220 See Hills, supra note 81, at 147 & n.3.
221 On the importance of standpoint in considering questions of deference, see
Schauer, supra note 53, at 1573-76.
222 See id. at 1572-74 (drawing on and extending SOPER, supra note 28).
223 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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and undertheorized as a tool of constitutional law. I have attempted
to bring a greater degree of order to the subject by dividing deference
roughly into two general types: deference based on the legal authority
of the institution invoking deference, and deference based on the epistemic authority of that institution-although these justifications are
not entirely distinct, either in theory or in practice. Both of these
justifications for judicial deference have been offered in a variety of
circumstances involving a multitude of public and private institutions
before the courts.
Finally, I have argued that the relatively undertheorized status of
deference as a tool in constitutional law is important for at least two
reasons. First, it leaves us with more work to do in understanding deference, not just from the standpoint of the party (in this case, the
courts) that faces a request for deference, but also from the standpoint of the very institution that is invoking the court's deference.
From that standpoint, we can see that deferees have a quasi-moral
obligation to act in a responsible manner. 224 Where they fail to do so,
both the courts and a variety of other public and private actors may
fairly criticize these institutions for invoking deference. Second, the
more undertheorized deference is as a tool in constitutional law, the
more difficult it will be for courts to deal with situations in which they
face not one, but several competing institutions, each of which
demands deference. As we will see, FAIR provides precisely such an
example.
II.

RUMSFELD

v. FAIR

Placing the question of deference to one side for now, this Part
turns to the Supreme Court's decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).225 First, some background is
22 6
in order.
A.

The Solomon Amendment

Under the bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools
(AALS), every member school is bound to a policy of equal opportunity in employment, including equal treatment without regard to sex224 For those who might object to characterizing deferees' obligations in moral
terms, another way to think about those obligations is as partaking of a fiduciary character. For an elaboration of this notion in the administrative law context, see generally Evan J. Criddle, FiduciaryFoundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117
(2006).
225 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
226 See also Horwitz, supra note 4, at 516-33.
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ual orientation.2 2 7 Schools are expected to limit the use of their
facilities in recruitment or placement assistance to those employers
2 28
who are willing to abide by these principles of equal opportunity.
One potential employer is the United States military, which discriminates against gays and lesbians.2 29 Because of its policies, the military
has been the subject of various protests, limitations, and outright
230
restrictions on its ability to recruit law students on campus.
In 1994, in response to the law schools' opposition to on-campus
military recruiting, Congress passed the so-called Solomon Amendment. 23 1 Under the statute, a university or its "subelement," such as a
law school, may not prevent the government from recruiting students
on campus, or restrict the government's access to student information
for recruiting purposes. 23 2 Failure to comply with this provision carries with it significant funding consequences, for both the law school
and the university. A law school's noncompliance may result in the
government withdrawing all Defense Department funding from the
university as a whole, and a significant portion of nondefense govern2 33
ment funding from the law school itself.

227 BYLAWS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., INC. § 6-3(b) (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch.,
Inc. 2005), available at http://www.aals.org/about handbook-requirements.php.
Separate principles apply to religiously affiliated law schools. See ASS'N OF AM. LAW
SCH.,

INC.,

INTERPRETIVE

PRINCIPLES

TO

GUIDE

RELIGIOUSLY-AFFILIATED

MEMBER

SCHOOLS (1993), http://www.aals.org/about-handbook-sgp-rel.php.
228 See EXECUTIVE COMM. REGULATIONS § 6-3.2(a) (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Inc.
2005), available at http://www.aals.org/about handbook.regulations.php.
229 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (mandating discharge of members of the armed
forces who engage in "homosexual acts").

230 See, e.g., Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 281-83 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 547 U.S.
47 (2006).
231 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub L. No. 104-106,
§ 541(a), 110 Stat. 186, 315 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 &
Supp. V 2005)). For early commentary on the Solomon Amendment, see, for example, Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon: The First
Amendment and Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 205, 209-15
(2004); Sylvia Law, Civil Rights UnderAttack by the Militay, 7 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 117,
121-29 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Solomon's Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 351, 364-71 (1998); Amy Kapczynski, Comment, Queer Brinksmanship: Citizenship and the Solomon Wars, 112 YALE L.J. 673, 675 (2002); Peter H. Schuck,
Equal Opportunity Recruiting, AM. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 57.
232 See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
233 See id.§ 983(b), (d).
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An earlier version of the Solomon Amendment simply required
2 34
that military recruiters be granted "entry" to law school campuses,
without making clear what sort of treatment military recruiters would
be entitled to once they arrived there. 235 The Department of Defense
interpreted the policy as requiring "not only access to campuses, but
treatment equal to that accorded other recruiters,' 236 and its enforcement policies followed suit. 237 After the district court questioned

whether the Department's enforcement policy was justified by the
plain text of the statute, 238 Congress amended the statute to make
clear that law schools, and the broader academic institutions of which
they are a part, risk forfeiting federal funds if they
prohibit[], or in effect prevent[] . . .[the military] from gaining
access to campuses, or access to students ... on campuses, for pur-

poses of military recruiting[,] in a manner that is at least equal in
quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is
23 9
provided to any other employer.
In short, " [i] n order for a law school and its university to receive federal funding, the law school must offer military recruiters the same
access to its campus and students that it provides to the nonmilitary
recruiter receiving the most favorable access." 2 40
B.

The Supreme Court's Decision in FAIR

The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)
brought suit challenging the Solomon Amendment. FAIR is "an association of law schools and law faculties" whose "stated mission is to
promote academic freedom, support educational institutions in
opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights of institutions of
higher education. ' 24 1 Its members include a substantial number of
234 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337,
§ 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994), repealedby National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549(b)(1), 113 Stat. 512, 611 (1999).
235 See FAIR 547 U.S. at 54.
236 Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I), 390 F.3d 219,
227 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
237 See, e.g., id. at 227-28 (detailing the experience of Yale Law School and the
University of Southern California Law School).
238 See Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 321 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
239 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
240 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 55.
241 FAIR 1,291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
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law schools, only some of which have publicly identified themselves. 24 2
While some of those schools joined as institutions, the remainder are
members by virtue of a majority vote of the faculty rather than
through any formal institutional action.2 43 FAIR was joined in the litigation by the Society of American Law Teachers; various law student
groups and individual students; and two faculty members joining as
244
individual plaintiffs, Erwin Chemerinsky and Sylvia Law.

FAIR and the other plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. 2 45 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion. 246 A divided panel of the
Third Circuit reversed. The panel found that the Solomon Amendment violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment right not to engage in
24 7
compelled speech and their rights as expressive associations.
In a short opinion by Chief Justice Roberts for a unanimous
Court, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit.2 48 ChiefJustice
Roberts' substantive analysis begins with the "'broad and sweeping'- 249 power of Congress to "'provide and maintain"' the United
States military. 25 0 "[T] he fact that legislation that raises armies is subject to First Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore the
purpose of this legislation when determining its constitutionality," the
Court observed.2 51 At such moments, "'judicial deference ...

is at its

apogee.' ''252 Although the Court's emphasis on deference to Congress' exercise of its military powers largely drops out of the Court's
formal analysis at this point, this language makes clear that the rest of
the opinion will proceed in the shadow of the military deference
doctrine.
Although the Court recognized that even legislation relating to
the military is subject to some First Amendment constraints, 2 53 it held
242 See id. (noting that usually "FAIR membership is kept secret").
243 See FAIR Participating Law Schools, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/participating-schools.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
244 See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
245
246

Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.

247

See Forum for Academic and Inst'l Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR II), 390 F.3d

219, 229-46 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
248 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 70
(2006). Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.
249 Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
250 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13).
251 Id.
252 Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
253 See id.
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that no such constraints applied in this case. 254 The Court's First
Amendment analysis was nested within the larger question of unconstitutional conditions: that is, whether the First Amendment limited
"Congress' ability to place conditions on the receipt of funds. '255 The
Court sidestepped that issue, asking instead whether the Solomon
Amendment's conditions would be unconstitutional if they were
imposed directly on the law schools. 256 It divided that inquiry into
three separate First Amendment questions: a compelled speech question, an expressive conduct question, and an expressive association
question. It rejected each of these claims in turn.
With respect to the compelled speech claim, the Court distinguished the Solomon Amendment from its prior compelled speech
cases. 2 5 7 First, the government in those cases had dictated the actual
content of the compelled speech, while the law schools here were
merely required to provide the same "speech" in assisting military
recruiters that they provided to other employers. Second, nothing in
the Solomon Amendment involved "a Government-mandated pledge
or motto that the school must endorse." 2 58 Third, while speech was
central to those cases, the speech implicated by the Solomon Amendment was incidental to the statute's regulation of conduct. In short, "it
trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley to suggest
that" the speech involved in FAIR is the same as "forcing a student to
pledge allegiance, or forcing aJehovah's Witness to display the motto
259
'Live Free or Die."'
The Court made similarly short work of the FAIR plaintiffs' assertion that the Solomon Amendment effectively forced them to "host or
accommodate another speaker's message. '260 Unlike prior cases in
which it had found forced accommodation, 26 1 the law schools' accommodation activities under the Solomon Amendment-hosting interviews, holding recruiting receptions, and so forth-"lack the
254 Id. at 70.
255 Id. at 60.
256 See id. at 59-60.
257 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
258 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 63.
261 See id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding that a state public accommodation law could
not require parade organizers to include a group of gay and lesbian marchers); Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that a state agency could not require a utility company to include a thirdparty newsletter in its billing envelope)).
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expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a
newspaper." 262 In any event, law students are easily able to distinguish
"between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits
because [it is] legally required to do so."263
The Court next rejected the claim that barring military recruiters
from campus constitutes expressive conduct, an argument stemming
from the Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien.26 4 The Court
wrote that the First Amendment cannot possibly apply to all conduct
that "'intends ...to express an idea,'- 265 and characterized its earlier
'26 6
holdings as applying only to "conduct that is inherently expressive.
It took a narrow view of such conduct, suggesting that forbidding the
presence of military recruiters on campus was expressive, if at all,
"only because the law schools accompanied their conduct with speech
explaining it."267 Even if O'Brien did apply, the Court concluded, the
2 68
government "clearly satisfie [d]" the test applied under that case.

Finally, the Court rejected the FAIR plaintiffs? expressive association claims. It observed that military recruiters are only visitors to
campus, and do not seek "to become members of the school's expressive association." 269 Since the law schools remain free to protest the
military's presence, nothing about the Solomon Amendment
"mak[es] group membership [in the law school] less desirable."' 2711
Thus, the Solomon Amendment's effect on the law schools' associational rights raised no significant First Amendment concerns. The
Court concluded with a somewhat gratuitous slap at the FAIR plaintiffs for their "attempt[ ] to stretch a number of First Amendment
27 1
doctrines well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect."
C. FAIR Measure?: The Solomon Amendment Decision and First
Amendment Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in FAIR may represent what we

will come to think of as the Roberts Court's standard approach to the
262

Id. at 64.

263

Id. at 65.

264

391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968).

265
266

FAIR 547 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
Id. at 66.

267
268

Id.
Id. at 67.

269

Id. at 69.

270

Id. at 70.

271

Id.
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First Amendment. 2 72 It is a short, seemingly clear, no-nonsense opinion. It cuts to the heart of the case, sweeps aside specious or overreaching arguments, and applies generous helpings of common sense
to reach its result. All this is seemingly to the good. The "arsenal of
First Amendment rules, principles, standards, distinctions, presumptions, tools, factors, and three-part tests" is already full enough as it
is.273 There surely is much virtue in a Court declining to add to it.
Nor was the result in FAIR a surprise. If anything, it is fair to say
that the Court's ruling was largely a foregone conclusion. 2 74 Even
those of us who believed that the case raised serious issues of constitutional law-although not necessarily the same ones presented by the
FAIR plaintiffs themselves-understood that these arguments entailed
moving beyond the current state of First Amendment law, and that
the plaintiffs ultimately would likely fail. 2 75 One might thus conclude

quite reasonably that FAIR was a decision compelled by both precedent and common sense.
But there is more to it than that. The simplicity of Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion in FAIR comes at the expense of genuine clarity and
consistency. As Jack Balkin has observed, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion "makes the result look easy, and he makes it look easy by artfully
272 See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court Upholds the Federal Statute Giving
Military Recruiters Campus Access, Despite "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, "FINDLAW'S WRIT, Mar. 9,
2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20060309.html; Posting of David Barron to LawCulture, http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/2006/03/itsnot-ustfo.html (Mar. 6, 2006, 19:08).
273 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004). See generally Paul
Horwitz, Law's Expression: The Promise and PerilsofJudicial Opinion Writing in Canadian
Constitutional Law, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 101, 121-25 (2000) (arguing in favor of
'open-textured minimalism" to ensure that constitutional decisions decide cases narrowly while encouraging public dialogue on the meaning of the Constitution); Robert
F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985) (arguing that the
Court's multipronged tests and formulaic styles isolate it from both the Constitution
and the public at large).
274 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Note on Rumsfeld v. FAIR and the Legal Academy,
2006 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 47 (calling the decision in FAIR "neither momentous nor
unexpected"); cf. Peter Berkowitz, US. Military: 8, Elite Law Schools: 0, How Many
ProfessorsDoes It Take to Misunderstandthe Law?, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 20, 2006, at 10,
10-13 ("How could so many law professors of such high rank and distinction be so
wrong about such straightforward issues of constitutional law?"); Posting of Jack M.
Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/03/alls-fair-in-law-and-war.
html (Mar. 15, 2006, 18:34) (noting that commentators "suggested that the law
schools didn't know what they were doing in bringing the case").
275 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 523-26.
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dodging every interesting constitutional law question in sight." 27 6
Since my primary goal in this Article is to consider the role of deference in FAIR, I will not offer a thorough doctrinal critique of FAIR
here. 277 But it is worth pausing long enough to demonstrate just how
much of FAIR's seemingly reasonable opinion conflicts with or unsettles current First Amendment doctrine. As we will see, these doctrinal
tensions ultimately are deeply connected to this Article's larger discussion of deference.
Consider the Court's cursory treatment of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, 278 which was implicated here by virtue of the Solomon Amendment's use of federal funds as a means of imposing conditions on the law schools' treatment of military recruiters. This is, of
course, a notoriously difficult area of constitutional law. 279 What is
noteworthy about the Court's opinion here, however, is not what it
says, but all that it leaves unsaid. In prior cases, the Court had suggested that the doctrine might apply differently in cases in which a
funding condition "would distort the usual functioning of' particular
institutions as First Amendment speakers.2 8 0 Thus, in Rust v. Sullivan,281 the Court noted that "the university is a traditional sphere of
free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that
the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by
276 Balkin, supra note 274; see also Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, A Different
Take on the Supreme Court's Recent Decision ConcerningLaw Schools' FirstAmendment Rights

and Campus Military Recruitment,

FINDLAw'S

WRIT,

Mar. 17,

2006, http://

writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060317_brownstein.html ("[W]e think... the
Court's opinion last week ... didn't really engage past Court doctrines and precedents; whatever the quality of the plaintiffs' arguments, the Court needed to say much
more than it did in explaining its result."); Dale Carpenter & Robert Corn-Revere,
Rumsfeld v. FAIR: What Does It Mean ?,FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Mar. 9, 2006, http:/
/www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=16613
(exploring some of the
questions left unanswered by FAIR).
277 For such a critique, see Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO Sup.
CT. Rxv. 217, 233-53.
278 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 54

(2006).
279 For exemplary discussions, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4,
26-28 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1326-51 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-49
(1968).
280 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n (ALA), 539 U.S. 194, 213 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (discussing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001)).
281 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

111

NOTRE

4

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government
28 2
funds" might be especially restricted.
The Court here simply ignores such concerns altogether. It
avoids the issue by finding that because the underlying First Amendme nt claims at issue in the case fail, Congress can "directly require the
schools to allow the military to recruit on campus." 28 3 As Dale Carpenter has noted, we are left with the striking conclusion that "the
government could [directly] require schools to admit military
recruiters under threat of criminal sanction, not merely withdraw
funds from schools that bar recruiters."' 28 4 FAIR thus leaves the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the same unsettled state it was
in before, and does so in a way that raises broad and troubling implications for future cases.
More difficult questions of coherence and consistency are raised
by the Court's direct treatment of the First Amendment issues raised
in FAIR Consider the Court's treatment of the compelled speech
issue. 28 5 The Court's rejection of the compelled speech claim is ultimately grounded on its conclusion that "nothing in the Solomon
Amendment restricts what [the law schools] may say about the military's policies." 28 6 That makes the case, in the Court's view, "a far cry
from the compelled speech" at issue in prior cases. 28 7 But the same
option was available in some of the very cases the Court sought to
distinguish. In Wooley v. Maynard,28 8 for instance, Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent that Maynard was free to "place on [his] bumper a
conspicuous bumper sticker explaining in no uncertain terms" his
"violent[] disagree[ment]" with the "Live Free or Die" license plate
motto. 2

9

Indeed, in another compelled speech case the FAIR Court

attempted to distinguish, the Court treated the very fact that the
speaker would be forced to voice its disagreement with the govern282 Id. at 200; see also ALA, 539 U.S. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine might apply differently where the government uses its funds "to impose controls on an important medium of expression").
283 Carpenter, supra note 277, at 228.
284 Id. at 254.
285 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47,
60-68 (2006). For an excellent recent treatment of the compelled speech doctrine,
see Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
286 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 49.
287 Id. at 62.
288 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
289 Id. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d
454, 457 (N.H. 1972)).
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ment as a First Amendment problem in and of itself.29 0 In short,
whatever the merits of the conclusions ultimately reached by the
Court on the compelled speech claim in FAIR, it fails either to show
that the questions raised by the case are as easy as it says, or to provide
a decent justification for its conclusions.
Similar difficulties are evident in the Court's rejection of FAIR's
expressive conduct claim on the grounds that only "conduct that29is1
inherently expressive" is entitled to First Amendment expression.
Flag burning, it suggests, is "inherently expressive. '29 2 By contrast,
"the conduct regulated by the Solomon Amendment"-namely, the
law schools' efforts to welcome or to bar military recruiters-"is not
inherently expressive," 293 and is thus removed from the pale of the
First Amendment altogether. 294 Any expression on the law schools'
part exists "only because the law schools accompanied their conduct
''
with speech explaining it. 295

The Court's thin treatment of this issue leaves a host of questions
in its wake. In truth, nothing is "inherently" expressive. 29 6 Until now,
the Court's method for determining whether conduct is expressive
had been to focus on whether particular conduct carries a combination of speaker's intent and audience understanding-the so-called
Spence test.29 7 In short, the Court examined the context in which particular conduct occurred to determine whether it was expressive or
not. It was this contextual approach that led the Court in Johnson to
conclude that burning a flag, in circumstances in which an individual
intended to convey a message of disdain for the United States and in
which audience members understood him to be conveying that mes290 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality
opinion) ("[T]here can be little doubt that appellant will feel compelled to respond
to arguments and allegations made by [the third party] in its messages to appellant's
customers. That kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion that the
First Amendment seeks to foster.").
291 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added). The novel nature of this doctrinal
move is discussed in Carpenter & Corn-Revere, supra note 276.
292

FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66 (discussing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).

293

Id.

294 In Frederick Schauer's terms, rather than treat the Solomon
as raising a question of the appropriate level of protection, the Court
a question of coverage, and concludes that, at least with respect
expressive conduct claims, the case is just not covered by the First
Schauer, supra note 273, at 1769-74.

Amendment case
treats it as raising
to the plaintiffs'
Amendment. See

295

FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.

296

See Carpenter, supra note 277, at 244-45.

297

See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).

1116

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

sage, was expressive conduct. 29 8 It was the context in which the flag
burning occurred, and not anything immanent in the act of flag burning itself, that made it expressive. Indeed, some of the contextual factors considered by the Court in Johnson included the fact that
Johnson's actions took place at a political demonstration, and that
Johnson subsequently described his actions as expressive at trial. 29 9 In

other words, a substantial part of the reason the Johnson Court treated
with
the flag burning in that case as expressive conduct had to do, 3not
"the conduct itself," but "the speech that accompanie [d] it." 00
The FAIR Court, in its eagerness to characterize the law schools'
conduct as nonexpressive, neglects the Spence test altogether. Thus, it
fails to ask whether the law schools' decision to deliberately exclude
military recruiters from campus, in a context in which they sought to
advance a policy of nondiscrimination, could be treated as sending a
"message," and whether an audience of law faculty and students,
among others, could understand that message. Dale Carpenter has
plausibly suggested that "[t]he answer . . . should have been 'yes' to

both questions." 30 1 Again, whatever the answer to these questions
ought to be in the final analysis, the Court hardly provides an adequate justification of its conclusion, and it leaves in its wake a variety
of difficult and unanswered questions about the shape and scope of
First Amendment doctrine.
Similar difficult questions arise with respect to each aspect of the
Court's First Amendment analysis in FAIR. I will not rehash all of
them here. 0 2 My goal, after all, has not been to argue that the Court
was wrong on the First Amendment issues raised in FAIR. Rather, it
has been to suggest that, despite the conventional wisdom on FAIR,
the Court's opinion in this case was not preordained, and its reasoning is far from clearly correct. For all its seeming simplicity, FAIR
obscures a host of troubling issues that should be cause for real concern among First Amendment scholars.
This conclusion in turn suggests two somewhat subtler points,
which point both to the beginning of this Article and to its next Part.
First, looking back to the Introduction, we can view the troubling doctrinal questions that emerge from FAIR not as a result of poorjudicial
craftsmanship, nor as an example of the compromises necessary to
pull together a unanimous Court. Rather, they are the product of
298 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1989).
299 Id. at 406.
300 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66.
301 Carpenter & Corn-Revere, supra note 276.
302 For a superb discussion of these and other First Amendment issues in FAIR, see
Carpenter, supra note 277, at 233-53.
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problems residing at a more fundamental level of First Amendment
jurisprudence. The fault lies in the instability and incoherence that
emerge from the tension between the Court's desire to arrive at an
acontextual set of governing rules for the First Amendment, and the
competing desire to respond to the complexity and diversity of the
actual facts on the ground in First Amendment cases.
Second, the critique of the opinion I have offered thus far is ultimately intimately connected to this Article's examination of deference. Whether or not the Court said so directly, many of the most
troubling questions about the Court's treatment of First Amendment
doctrine in FAIR are ultimately questions about how the Court knows
what it purports to know in this case. How does it know when the
government's requirement that an entity comply with various directives-assisting military recruiters, placing messages on license plates,
and so on-rises to the level of meaningful compelled speech, and
when it is mere "trivia[]"? 3 0

3

How does it know when particular con-

duct is expressive, and from whose perspective should we answer that
question?
These are all ultimately questions about how the Court can form
the knowledge that it needs to make its judgments-knowledge about
the real world in which speech and association occur. As I have
shown, deference is one of the central devices that the Court uses to
acquire this knowledge, or to substitute for its own lack of knowledge.
The Court's terse opinion in FAIR thus conceals a host of profoundly
difficult questions concerning how the Court knew what it purported
to know in FAIR and to whom it should have deferred. I turn to those
questions now.
III.

THREE FACES OF DEFERENCE IN RUMSFELD V.

FAIR

The time has now come to put this Article's deepened understanding of deference to work in examining the Court's decision in
FAIR Leaving aside the doctrinal problems I have just addressed,
FAIR suffers from two principal flaws. First, the undertheorized
nature of deference in constitutional law left the Court ill-equipped to
deal with a case that so substantially relied on deference as a decisive
factor. Second, that difficulty was compounded by the fact that FAIR
presented the Court not simply with a single institution's claim of deference, but with three competing claims of deference. The Court's resolution of those competing claims was more than unsatisfactory:
indeed, its assessment of the competing claims to deference in FAIR
303

FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62.
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got things exactly backward. This conclusion is best reached by examining each of the competing claims to deference that arose in the
case.
A.

Military Deference

The first claim of deference at issue in FAIR is also the most crucial to the Court's opinion: deference to the military-or, more accurately, deference to Congress in its exercise of supervisory power over
the military. Congress, in asserting the need for the expansion of the
Solomon Amendment, asserted that "[t]he military's ability to perform at [a high] standard can only be maintained with effective and
uninhibited recruitment programs."3 0 4 The goveinment argued
before the Court that this and similar statements about the necessity
of the Solomon Amendment demanded a deferential posture from
the Court, because the case "involve [d] a challenge to a military judgment. '3 0 5 It added that deference was appropriate because the Court
had no business "second-guessing empirical claims about military
30°6
readiness made by the political Branches and the military.
To say the Court accepted the petitioners' claim of deference is
an understatement. The Court spoke briefly but bluntly on the
matter:
[T]he fact that legislation that raises armies is subject to First
Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore the purpose
of this legislation when determining its constitutionality; as we recognized in Rostker, 'judicial deference . . .is at its apogee" when
Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies.
. . . Congress' decision to proceed indirectly [through its
spending power rather than directly under its military power] does
not reduce the deference given to Congress in the area of military
307
affairs.
The Court had little more to say about the government's invocation of judicial deference.3 0 8 But deference to the military neverthe304 150 CONG. REc. H1695 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Myrick).
305 Brief for the Petitioners at 38, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152).
306 Id. at 39.
307 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
308 In rejecting the Third Circuit's conclusion that the government had failed to
"produce evidence establishing that the Solomon Amendment was necessary and
effective," the Court did add that such judgments are "for Congress, not the courts,"
again citing Rostker. Id. at 67 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13; Rostker, 453
U.S. at 64-65).
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less plainly pervades the Court's opinion in FAIR3 0 9 The Court's
opinion "treats the liberty claims [made by the FAIR plaintiffs almost
with contempt,"31 0 swallowing whole the claims of necessity made by
the government and sweeping aside the respondents' assertions as a
"stretch," "plainly overstat[ed]," "exaggerate[ed]," and "trivializ[ing]
the freedom protected" in prior First Amendment cases. 31 1 For good
measure, the Court throws in apparently gratuitous references to the
terror strikes of September 11, 2001.312 In sum, deference to the military is a tidal wave in FAJR, overwhelming any skepticism concerning
Congress' claims about the necessity of the Solomon Amendment and
washing away any competing claims to deference raised by the law
school plaintiffs.
The Court's approach to the military deference claim in FAIR is
subject to criticism on several grounds. First, one might launch a
frontal assault on judicial deference to the military, or to Congress'
exercise of its military power. The military deference doctrine has
been subject to extensive criticism. 3 13 Perhaps the most sustained and
interesting work on this subject has come from Professor Diane
Mazur, who has written to criticize both the Court's deferential
approach to the military and the legal academy's own failure to
engage on a constructive level with the military. 31 4 Mazur argues persuasively that military deference doctrine has long since slipped loose
of any reasonable restraints, and has instead become "an all-purpose
tool to avoid detailed scrutiny of factual and legal assertions about the
309

See Carpenter, supra note 277, at 235 ("While the Court has always been defer-

ential to Congress' judgment about military needs, this deference in cases like FAIR
becomes almost complete submission.").
310 Id. at 234.
311 FAIR, 547 U.S. at 62, 69.
312 See id. at 53 ("[T]he Government-after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001-adopted an informal policy of 'requir[ing] universities to provide military
recruiters access to students in equal quality and scope to that provided other
recruiters."' (quoting Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291
F. Supp. 2d. 269, 283 (D.N.J. 2003))); see also Carpenter, supra note 277, at 234-35
(noting that "[t]here is . . . no evidence that the government was addressing any
problem arising from 9/11 when it decided to expand the reach of the Solomon
Amendment," and arguing that such references do little more than "try to silence
serious critics of government policy" while demonstrating an "unthinking acceptance
of almost any security claim made by the government").
313 See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 49, at 487-98; Mazur, supra note 104; Dienes, supra
note 51, at 798-827.
314 See Mazur, supra note 49, at 487-510; Diane H. Mazur, Is "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"
UnconstitutionalAfter Lawrence ? What It Will Take to Overturn the Policy, 15 U. FLA.J.L.

& PUB. POL'V 423, 431-41 (2004); Mazur, supra note 104, at 703; Diane H. Mazur, Why
ProgressivesLost the War When They Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 580 (2003).
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military." 3 15 While there is much in Professor Mazur's work to be
commended,3 16 we need not go that far here. Surely there are occasions in which, for reasons of legal or epistemic authority or both,
judicial deference to the military or to Congress as the regulator of
the military is appropriate.3 17 So we may set aside a general critique
of military deference. Even so, the Court's treatment of military deference in FAIR leaves much to be desired.
First, as a matter of epistemic authority, there is good cause to
question the Court's deference to Congress with respect to the needs
of military recruiters. Nothing in the record before the Court indicated that Congress had acted from a position of epistemic authority.
The debate over the Solomon Amendment showed no serious,
informed consideration of whether military recruiters required equal
access to law school students in order to achieve any recruiting objectives.3 18 If anything, the evidence suggested that Congress was acting
in the teeth of a superior epistemic authority: the Department of
Defense, whose expertise in military matters surely outstrips that of
the generalists in Congress. As the congressional debate disclosed,
the Department of Defense considered the Solomon Amendment
"unnecessary" and "duplicative."'3 19 This fact alone does not eliminate
Congress' entitlement to deference, of course. As a matter of epistemic authority, however, it certainly takes the wind out of Congress'
sails, and demonstrates again that invocations of judicial deference
alone cannot supply a final answer to the Court in cases in which competing claims of epistemic authority are at issue.
As a matter of legal authority, too, the Court's willingness to surrender its judgment to Congress was unwarranted by Congress' own
behavior. To the extent that an institution claiming legal authority315 Mazur, supra note 49, at 481.
316 In particular, her focus on law schools' failure to bridge the military-civilian
gap by engaging more closely with the military is a valuable argument that deserves
far wider attention. See generally id. at 477, 498-510 (taking law schools "to task for a
counterproductive over-reliance on expressive shunning of the military from the law
school community").
317 See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-64 (1948) (finding Congress' power to raise and support armies justified deference to congressional decisions regarding conscription of manpower, supplies and equipment, and
compensation for such conscription during the "previously unimagined" conditions
of World War II).
318 This lack of evidence is well canvassed in the amicus brief of the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network in FAIR Brief for Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17-28, Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
319 140 CONG. REC. 11,440 (1994) (statement of Rep. Underwood).

2008]

THREE

FACES

OF DEFERENCE

1121

based deference is obliged to deliberate soundly and meaningfully
32 0
about subjects that are within the clear scope of its legal authority,
Congress fell short of this obligation. The legal authority argument
for judicial deference to Congress in military matters is not that Congress may do what it likes where the military is concerned; rather, it is
that Congress should be given substantial deference where it is genuinely attempting to regulate the affairs of the military. Here, Congress
was not acting to regulate the military so much as it was acting to
punish the universities. The record is replete with indications that
Congress was far less concerned with military readiness than it was
with "send [ing] a message over the wall of the ivory tower of higher
education" that the "starry-eyed idealism" of the universities "comes
with a price."3 21 Nothing in any of this rhetoric suggests that Congress

passed the Solomon Amendment with any regulatory interest in mind
that related specifically to the well-being and readiness of the military.
To the contrary, Congress' clear interest here was to send universities a
message of harsh disapproval about their access policies with respect
to military recruiters.
My point here is not that Congress was wrong to disapprove of
the law schools' actions, or that it could not, within constitutional limits, seek a legislative means of registering its disapproval. Of course it
could. Rather, the question is whether, having acted as it did and for
the reasons it did, Congress was entitled to invoke judicial deference
for its general assertion that requiring equal access to military
recruiters was necessary to ensure military readiness. Given that Congress was acting outside the proper scope and subject matter of its
legal authority as the military's regulator, there is simply no good reason why the Court should have deferred as it did in FAIR 32 2 In a
somewhat different context, Diane Mazur has observed that Congress
320 See supra Part I.E.
321 140 CONG. REc. 11,441 (1994) (statement of Rep. Pombo); see also id. at 11,439
(statement of Rep. Solomon) (suggesting that the purpose of the Solomon Amendment was to "tell [] recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that if you
do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its policies, that is fine," but "do not
expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our military recruiters").
322 This does not mean that an equal access policy might not, indeed, serve the
interests of military recruiters. There are certainly common sense reasons to suppose
that it would. See, e.g.,
Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of
Association: Why the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutionaland Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 415, 429 (2005). The question is whether,
given the extent of Congress' evident interest in sending a message to universities
with the Solomon Amendment, and its equally evident indifference to the actual
question of whether the Amendment served military needs, its general and unsupported "common-sense conclusion [s]" on this question were worthy of deference as a
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sometimes relies on the military deference doctrine not to assert its
legal or epistemic superiority to the courts on military matters, but to
"state its views about equality" and other constitutional matters while
3 23
insulating itself from the independent judgment of the courts.
That is precisely what happened in FAIR Congress wished to make a
statement about the way in which universities exercised their speech
rights, a matter in which the courts often defer to universities but certainly do not defer to external regulators, while invoking military deference doctrine to fend off the more searching judicial review that
would normally be triggered by such a statement. Such a stratagem is
simply not worthy of deference, on epistemic or legal authority
grounds.
The Court's excessive deference to the military in FAIR suffers
from two other flaws, both of them related to the question of the
appropriate scope of deference in such cases. First, FAIR is far afield
from those cases in which the legal and epistemic authority of the
military, or of Congress as the author of military regulations, is most
pertinent. Recall that one of the foundations of the military deference doctrine is that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society."3 24 In those circumstances, it makes
sense to conclude that constitutional rights must be interpreted in a
way that respects the military's need to "foster instinctive obedience,
unity, commitment, and esprit de corps. ' 325 In other words, the military deference doctrine is most applicable in cases that involve internal
matters of military discipline and order. FAIR was not such a case. It
concerned the internal operations of universities, not of the military.
To be sure, this doctrine is also based on the view that the political
branches are uniquely tasked with the responsibility of governing the
armed forces, and that those branches "have particular expertise in
assessing military needs." 3 26 But where, as in FAIR, Congress offered
no evidence in support of its military readiness claims, and the legislation operated primarily in the civilian sphere, the grounds for deference were far weaker than they would have been in a case involving
the military alone. 327 Thus, the need for deference to Congress in its
matter of epistemic or legal authority. Reply Brief for Petitioners in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152).
323 Mazur, supra note 49, at 500.
324 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
325 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
326 John F. O'Connor, Statistics and the Military Deference Doctrine: A Response to Professor Lichtman, 66 MD.L. REV. 668, 676 (2007).
327 O'Connor's article insists that the military deference doctrine may still apply in
cases involving civilians. See id. at 700-03. As a descriptive matter, that is true,
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guise as military regulator was not at its "'apogee'" in FAIR; 328 it was at
its nadir.
This point about the proper scope of the military deference doctrine can also be appreciated from a broader theoretical perspective.
Consider Professor Robert Post's seminal discussion of the different
domains of government authority in which the First Amendment
operates. Post distinguishes between the domains of "governance"
and "management. '3 29 When the government exercises managerial
authority, it "acts to administer organizational domains dedicated to
instrumental conduct." 33 0 When it acts managerially, it makes sense
to permit the government to "constitutionally regulate speech as necessary to achieve instrumental objectives."3'3 In those circumstances,
courts ought to defer "to the judgment of institutional officials
respecting the need to manage speech." 332 Prominent examples of
the government's exercise of managerial authority include its supervision of public employees, of prisoners, and of the military. By contrast, where government is exercising its "governance" authority to
regulate the affairs of everyday citizens in the "public realm, ' 333 judicial deference is not appropriate. In these cases, government is
bound instead by "ordinary principles of First Amendment
33 4
jurisprudence."
In some cases, the line between governance and management
may be unclear. One such case is Greer v. Spock.335 There, the Court
rejected a challenge by Dr. Benjamin Spock to the military's refusal to
permit him to give a campaign speech at Fort Dix. 3 3 6 The case thus
involved a civilian challenge to a military regulation affecting both his
although one may question just how far the military deference doctrine should apply
in such cases-particularly where a law operates entirely in the civilian world, where it
has a significant impact on individual rights, and where Congress' invocation of military needs is cursory at best. In any event, O'Connor concedes that the doctrine is
less applicable where a law primarily involves "the constitutional guarantees of everyday citizens," id. at 700, and suggests that the courts should give substantial consideration to the rights of individual civilians in cases involving laws that "primarily
burden[] nonmilitary personnel or entities" id. at 702.
328 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 58
(2006) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
329 PosT, supra note 65, at 200, 240.
330 Id. at 200.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 240.
333 Id. at 200.
334 Id. at 240.
335 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
336 See id. at 840.
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First Amendment rights and those of his listeners. At the same time, it
is clear that the government was not simply regulating the general
public domain; rather, it was regulating the internal affairs of a military base, a nonpublic forum in which the military's desire to govern
its own affairs in order to ensure a well-disciplined fighting force was
33 7
genuinely deserving of deference.
FAIR is far less ambiguous. The government here was clearly acting in the realm of governance, not management. It was not regulating the internal affairs of the military, but rather was seeking to use its
regulatory power over the military to colonize the realm of public discourse. In those circumstances, Post is right: "ordinary principles of
First Amendment jurisprudence," and not deference, should be the
order of the day. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, if there was a strong
argument in FAIR for judicial deference based on respect for managerial institutions, it was owed to the law schools, not the military.
B. Dale Deference
The second competing claim for judicial deference came from
the law school plaintiffs: the claim that the law schools, as expressive
associations, were entitled to substantial deference under the Court's
decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.33 8

In that case, the Court

made clear that it would defer substantially to an expressive association in evaluating its claims about its own purposes as an association
and in considering whether particular laws or conduct would impair
its ability to express itself.3

39

A claim of "Dale deference," if fully

accepted by the Court in FAIR, would have led it to defer substantially
to the law schools' own description of their expressive interests and to
defer to their assertion that the Solomon Amendment significantly
interfered with their ability to function as expressive associations.
Dale has been the subject of voluminous discussion and criticism,
and I will not rehash it here.3 40 For now, I shall assume that the
Court's opinion in Dale was correct, or at least that it was sincere: that
the Court genuinely intended to extend substantial deference to the
views of expressive associations. Given that assumption, a few observations about the role of Dale deference in FAIR are in order.
337 See id. at 837-40.
338 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
339 See, e.g., id. at 653.
340 See, e.g., Symposium, The Freedom of Expressive Association, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1475
(2001); Symposium, Perspectives on ConstitutionalExemptions to Civil Rights: Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 591 (2001).
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First, one finds few traces in FAIR of the Dale Court's sweeping
language concerning deference. Professor Carpenter rightly observes
that the "deferential posture [of Dale] is completely missing from the
FAIR decision both in rhetoric and in substance. 3 4 1 The Court did
not directly reject the law schools' claim of deference, to be sure. But
the Court's narrow construction of Dale, which reads associational
rights as implicated only in cases that either directly involve membership rights or make group membership "less attractive, '342 effectively
allows the Court to sidestep the law schools' expressive association
claim altogether.
But there is more to FAIR's treatment of Dale deference than this.
The Court's language brims with skepticism toward the FAIR plaintiffs' claims: "The law schools say that allowing military recruiters
equal access impairs their own expression by requiring them to associ'3 44
ate with the recruiters . . . ,,143 It "almost mocks their claims.
FAIR does not simply hold that Dale is inapplicable to the plaintiffs'
claims. Rather, it suggests that the Court is exasperated by the law
schools' insistence that they are affected as expressive associations by
the Solomon Amendment. Certainly there is not so much as a hint of
deference to FAIR or its law school members as expressive
associations.
There are at least two possible reasons for the absence of deference here. First, it seems apparent that FAIR is an example of the
kind of rhetorical overkill that may occur when a court lacks any specific tools to select between competing claims of deference, and yet
feels obliged to privilege one over the other. At no point does the
Court openly acknowledge that more than one claim of deference
might be relevant in the case. Nor does the Court offer a blueprint
for the principled resolution of cases involving competing claims of
deference. Instead, it launches its opinion with a statement in support of deference to Congress' exercise of its war powers that is so
strong that it sweeps aside any possibility of even acknowledging the
law school plaintiffs' competing claims of epistemic or legal authority
3

as expressive associations.

45

341 Carpenter, supra note 277, at 252.
342 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 69
(2006).
343 Id.
344 Carpenter, supra note 277, at 252. Judge Posner puts it more kindly, noting
the opinion's "polite but unmistakable rebuke of the legal professoriat for overreaching." Posner, supra note 274, at 51.
345 Cf The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: Leading Cases, 120 HAmv. L. REv. 125, 259
(2006) ("[A]n association's privilege of self-interpretation seemingly disappeared,
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Second, it seems evident that the FAIR Court refuses to defer not
simply because it concludes that Dale was not meant to apply in situations like this one, but because the Court is confident that, on epistemic and legal authority grounds, it is at least equal to the law school
plaintiffs, if not superior. The Court's strong conclusion that the law
schools lose none of their associational freedom under the Solomon
Amendment suggests that it simply believes that nothing about requiring the on-campus presence of military recruiters can meaningfully
affect the mission of the law schools. And that in turn suggests that
the Court is confident that it understands what the mission of those
law schools is, and what it entails. To say, as the Court does, that "[a]
military recruiter's mere presence on campus does not violate a law
school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school
considers the recruiter's message, ' '3

46

is not entirely unreasonable.

What is significant, though, is the fact that the Court feels entitled to
reach that conclusion on its own, without deferring to the expertise of
the expressive association itself.
The Court could have taken a similarly assertive approach in Dale
itself. Surely the Boy Scouts do not rise to the level of an occult mystery, and the Court could have drawn its own conclusions about the
Scouts' mission. Of course, it did not, preferring instead to defer to
the Scouts' own superior knowledge concerning their organization's
purposes and what would impair those purposes. 347 The change in
the Court's approach to such questions in FAIR is unjustified. There
is no reason to think that law schools are any less epistemically superior to courts with respect to their understanding of their own mission
than the Boy Scouts were. Moreover, there is every reason to think
that law schools are not uniform, and may vary greatly as expressive
associations. Some may match the Court's description; others may
prize nondiscrimination so greatly that even trivial cooperation with
the military might significantly affect their ability to carry out their
mission. The Court's confident assessment of the law school plaintiffs
in FAIR suggests a broad implicit conclusion: "All law schools are the
same. They teach and sponsor research. Anything else just isn't part
of the core purpose of the law school." That is not necessarily true for
every law school. Even if it were, however, what is troubling is the
Court's very confidence that it is right, its refusal to acknowledge that
the law schools are in a better position than the Court to understand
either erased from the law books entirely or merely overwhelmed by the deference
owed to Congress's war powers.").
346 FAJR,547 U.S. at 70.
347 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
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what they do and what would impair them. Had the Court taken Dale
more seriously, it would have deferred far more to the law schools on
348
these questions. That it did not is disturbing.
Having said all this, I must nevertheless confess some ambivalence about the FAIR plaintiffs' heavy reliance on Dale deference.
The Court should have paid more attention to the plaintiffs' Dale deference arguments. But that does not mean those arguments should
have been central to the plaintiffs' case. Dale deference is a catchall
form of deference involving a broad spectrum of expressive associations. But universities are a more specific subset of expressive association, one with a long history of professional norms and practices, and
an equally long history of deferential judicial treatment. Dale deference is thus not the most precise legal tool available to evaluate
whether, when, and how much courts ought to defer to plaintiffs like
the FAIR plaintiffs. The law schools could have turned to the longer
tradition of judicial deference to universities. What that form of deference entails, what the Court did with it in FAIR, and what it might
have meant for the law school plaintiffs, are the subjects of the next
subpart.
C. Grutter Deference and Universities as First Amendment Institutions
The final form of deference at issue in FAIR concerns deference
to universities as educational institutions. Although this form of deference has been around for decades, I will call it " Grutter deference,"
after Grutter v. Bollinger,349 a recent and particularly prominent and
350
important example of this approach.

Grutter involved a challenge to the use of race as a factor in the
admissions program for the University of Michigan Law School. The
Law School argued that its use of race was essential to its mission of
seeking a diverse student body, and that this interest in diversity
should be counted as a compelling state interest.3 51 Writing for the
Court, Justice O'Connor declared that "[t]he Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mis348 Some of the flavor of the Court's presumptuous approach here is nicely captured by Pamela Karlan, who observes that the Justices, who all have firsthand knowledge of "elite law schools," "are perhaps simultaneously more trusting, and more
skeptical, about how [law] schools operate." Karlan, supra note 199, at 1614-15. Put
slightly differently, FAIR suggests that the Court is willing to "defer" to law schools and
universities-provided that they do not diverge from the Justices' own expectations
about the function of those institutions.
349 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
350 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 464; Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1529.
351 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-28.
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Such "complex educational

judgments," she continued, lie "primarily within the expertise of the
university." 353 The Court thus deployed deference as a powerful tool
in finding that educational diversity was a compelling state interest.
As Justice O'Connor observed, this determination was consistent with
a long tradition on the Court of "giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed
limits." 354

This brief description understates the powerful effect of deference to the university in Grutter.3 5 5 Although Grutterwas a Fourteenth
Amendment case, 35 6 it relied to a significant degree on the Court's
willingness to defer to the university's assessment of the importance of
diversity to its academic mission, a deference that stemmed in turn
from the Court's treatment of academic freedom under the First
Amendment.
Grutter deference thus bespeaks a separate, and more specific,
form of deference than Dale deference. It represents a form of deference to universities as "First Amendment institutions"-institutions
that are vital to public discourse, that have a distinct and well-established character, and that generally follow a specific set of norms and
practices that make it possible for courts to treat them as substantially
autonomous institutions. 35 7 Under Grutter deference, courts recognize that universities are entitled to deference for reasons of both epistemic and legal authority. Epistemically, courts are aware that they
are ill-suited to "evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
352 Id. at 328.
353 Id.
354 Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985));
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6

(1978)).
355

See generally Horwitz, supra note 4, at 467, 495-97 (arguing that "the Law

School was accorded deference far beyond that granted to any other institution whose
affirmative action policies had come before the Court").
356 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
357 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 567-74 (noting the Grutter Court's sensitivity to
the institutional character of First Amendment subjects); Horwitz, supra note 1, at
1510-12 (arguing that such institutions contribute significantly to public discourse
and are largely self-regulating); Schauer, supra note 172, at 919-26 (suggesting that
granting institutions a "considerable degree" of political autonomy "may be both normatively attractive and highly consistent with First Amendment doctrine"); see also
Hills, supra note 81, 175-96 (discussing the constitutional importance of a wide variety of groups that the author labels "private governments," and arguing that their
contributions to the polity merit a substantial degree of legal autonomy).
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decisions" made by universities. 358 And whether they are public or
private, universities also partake of a quality of legal authority that is
equally deserving of deference. They are "intermediate institutions" 3

59

of ancient historical pedigree, which serve a vital function at

one remove from the state, and on which the state is ultimately dependent for the formation and development of public discourse. 360 To
that end, the First Amendment substantially insulates these intermediate institutions from subservience to the state, preserving a sphere of
3 61
sovereignty in which they can operate independently.
3 62 I
Having explored this form of deference at length elsewhere,
will be sparing here. In brief, Grutter deference, or deference to universities as First Amendment institutions, involves the willingness, if
not obligation, of the courts to defer substantially to universities' own
judgments on matters such as what their academic mission requires,
within "constitutionally prescribed limits." 3 63 To be sure, the courts

will defer only in cases in which a university is genuinely exercising
academic judgment;3 64 in other words, to earn deference, the university must act within the sphere of its legal and epistemic authority.
But "courts should be careful not to police the boundaries of the 'genuinely academic' too rigorously. ' 365 Thus, courts should defer sub-

stantially to universities' own judgment about what their academic
mission requires, provided that they are actually making an academic
decision; and courts should also take a fairly deferential approach "in
3 66
determining what constitutes an academic decision."
Notwithstanding those who have argued that the decision in FAIR
was an easy one, an approach to the case that took seriously the kind
of deference the Court had displayed in a host of prior cases dealing
with academic freedom, and which had featured so prominently in
Grutterjust a few terms earlier, would have counseled a very different
358 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226.
359 Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul. Education and the Expression
of Associations, 85 MINN. L. Rrv. 1841, 1843 (2001).
360 Id. at 1848.
361 See, e.g.,
Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, TransportingFirstAmendment Norms
to the Private Sector With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537, 1625
(1998) ("Freedom of private association 'implies a degree of norm-generating autonomy on the part of the association'-'a liberty and capacity to create and interpret
law-minimally, to interpret the terms of the association's own being"' (quoting Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 32 (1983))).
362 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1504-32.
363 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
364 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1542.
365 Id.
366 Id. (emphasis added).
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set of reasons, if not a.different outcome. Under an approach that
took Grutter deference seriously, the Court would have been obliged
to defer substantially to the FAIR plaintiffs' assertion that their desire
to exclude military recruiters from campus, or to grant them something less than absolutely equal access, was compelled by their own
sense of their academic mission, and that compliance with the Solomon Amendment would do serious violence to that academic mission. 367

If the Court took a strongly deferential approach, that

assertion might have sufficed to defeat the government's own interest
in placing military recruiters on campus. Even if the Court had
openly weighed the competing interests of the military and the academy, the presumption in favor of educational institutional autonomy,
in cases that go to the core of what the university asserts is its own mission, might well outweigh the admittedly significant government interests at stake in FAIR.
Of course, that is not what happened. Having relied so heavily on
deference to the university's own "complex educational judgments" 368
just three years earlier in Grutter, the Court's response to the FAIR
plaintiffs' invocation of Grutter deference was ...

silence. The Court

did not conclude that any claim of deference to the universities as
academic institutions was outweighed by the government's strong
interest in military recruiting. Nor did it pay lip service to the Grutter
deference claim while quietly eviscerating it, as it did with the plaintiffs' Dale deference arguments. 3 69 Instead, it ignored altogether the
arguments in favor of deference to the law schools as educational
institutions.

370

That silence is an important failure on the Court's part. Viewed
properly, FAIR was a tale of competing claims to deference: military
deference, Dale deference, and Grutter deference. Rather than confront these competing claims openly and directly, the Court overrelied heavily on the first form of deference, paid lip service to the
second, and ignored the third. This clumsy approach speaks volumes
about the Court's difficulty in resolving competing claims to deference, all of which are grounded in the epistemic or legal authority of
the would-be deferee and all of which are supported by its prior
precedents.
367 SeeJoseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DuKEL.J. 821, 863
(2008) ("As with agency interpretations of their own regulations, organizations' interpretations of their animating institutional norms should be entitled to deference.").
368 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
369 See supra Part III.B.
370 See Roger W. Bowen, Unfair to FAIR, INSIDE HIGHER El, Mar. 9, 2006, http://
www.insidehighered.com/views/2006/03/09/bowen.
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Indeed, in many respects the claim to Grutter deference was not
the weakest claim to deference in FAIR, it was the strongest. As we
have seen, the invocation of deference to Congress' exercise of its war
powers was arguably far afield from the kinds of cases-cases involving
the exercise of genuine expertise by the military or Congress, or
involving the internal affairs of the armed forces-that most warrant
this form of deference. Similarly, although there were plausible arguments in favor of the FAIR plaintiffs' invocation of Dale deference,
that form of deference is not the most relevant for the university as a
First Amendment institution. But there is a long tradition of judicial
deference to universities' own sense of their academic mission, and it
should have applied in FAIR The kinds of questions occasioned by
the case-questions about whether particular law schools are neutral
institutions or are, instead, "normative" institutions; questions about
whether certain law schools prize equality and nondiscrimination, not
just as general values, but as essential aspects of their educational mission; and questions about whether the forced provision of equal
access to discriminatory employers such as the military offended that
mission-were squarely within the law schools' epistemic authority,
and directly implicated the kinds of academic questions that are at the
37
heart of the law schools' legal authority. '
Thus, there was at least a faint reason to hope that the Court
would defer substantially to the law schools' own assertions that the
Solomon Amendment interfered with their academic missions. Had it
done so, what seemed to some like a quixotic argument on the part of
the law schools might have stood a far greater chance of success. At
the very least, the Court would have dignified the law schools' argument for Grutterdeference with serious consideration by engaging in a
meaningful balancing of the military's claims to deference with those
of the law schools, even if it ultimately concluded that the government's interest outweighed the law schools'. 3 72 That the claim to
Grutterdeference faced such an ignominious fate in FAIR speaks less
to its vitality as a form of deference than it does to the Court's own
failure fully to confront and provide an adequate account of the occasions on which it defers to various institutions. And it speaks even
more clearly to the Court's failure to arrive at some method of resolving cases involving competing claims of deference.
371 For a recent discussion along these lines, organized around the philosophical
principle of subsidiarity and comparing the law schools' descriptions of their missions
in Grutterand FAIR, see Peter Widulski, Subsidiarilyand Protest: The Law School's Mission
in Grutter and FAIR, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 415, 420-24, 431-56 (2006-2007).
372 Cf Posner, supra note 274, at 57 ("The military has its needs as well, and perhaps even some expertise.").
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That is not yet the end of the matter, however. The institutional
First Amendment approach to the university that I have called Grutter
deference is not simply a license for universities to act as they
please. 37 3 As we have seen, a vital element of deference is the corresponding obligation of the deferee to act responsibly when it invokes
the deference of the courts. The deferee must act in a way that demonstrates that it is exercising the kind of epistemic and legal authority
that warrants deference in the first place.3 74 More particularly, in the

case of Grutterdeference, universities are under an obligation to exercise their autonomy in a way that is consistent with the deepest values
of those institutions. If we are willing to grant universities substantial
autonomy as First Amendment institutions, it is because we trust and
expect that they will seriously consider just what their own sense of
their academic mission entails and act accordingly, within the best traditions of those institutions.
It is possible that all of the law school plaintiffs in FAIR genuinely
believed that their academic missions would be critically endangered
by the presence of military recruiters on campus, and that their mission thus required nothing less than the exclusion of those recruiters.
Certainly the FAIR plaintiffs were willing to make such assertions
before the Court, and Grutter deference suggests that the Court
should have respected those assertions rather than second-guess
them. But judicialdeference is one thing, and credulity on the part of
fellow legal academics is quite another. From that perspective, one
might reasonably suspect that some of these institutions, at least, either
did not believe that their academic missions really required any such
thing, or simply had not given much sincere thought to the question.
Although the Solomon Amendment litigation made it expedient for
the FAIR plaintiffs to describe their desire to exclude military
recruiters in terms of academic mission, surely at least some of these
schools and faculty members lacked a genuinely academic interest in
doing so, or at least failed to "engage in any form of 'reasoned deliber3 75
ation"' on this question.
Considering this possibility gives rise in turn to a further set of
questions. One might start by asking whether the law school plaintiffs
373 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1553; cf. David Barnhizer, Freedom To Do What?
InstitutionalNeutrality, Academic Freedom, and Academic Responsibility, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC.
346, 348 (1993) ("Academic freedom is a privilege and a responsibility, not a personal
and unfettered license for the misuse of the increasingly scarce social resource represented by each faculty position.").
374 See supra Part I.D.
375 Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting
Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 149 (D. Mass. 1997)).
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in FAIR actually treated on-campus recruiting as a core aspect of their
missions. Did they, for instance, treat it as an important faculty matter,
subjecting it to reasoned discussion and supervision among the deans
and faculty-or did they shunt responsibility for recruiting onto their
administrative staffP 3 76 We might also ask whether the schools that
restricted access to military recruiters made a genuinely independent
academic decision, or whether they acted under actual or perceived
duress from some third party, such as the American Bar Association or
the American Association of Law Schools, both of which may exert
considerable pressure on law schools' practices in a way that reduces
the very possibility that any law school can be said to have an authentic
3 77
and independent sense of "mission."
One might also ask broader questions about these law schools'
perception of their own academic missions, and how they follow those
missions. For example, most law schools generally favor permitting a
wide diversity of viewpoints and arguments on the law school campus,
or permitting the presence of student groups or legal clinics whose
own policies are in some way exclusionary. Those schools would
arguably be in a poor position to argue that their missions required
restricting on-campus access to military recruiters.
Conversely, if a law school did adhere to a strong sense of nondiscrimination in its academic mission, and did treat on-campus
recruiting as an integral part of that mission, one might ask whether
the schools were similarly vigilant in restricting the on-campus access
of other discriminatory employers.3 7 8 In particular, one would ask
whether these schools also restricted access to their recruiting programs by a variety of employers who are also involved in sanctioning
376 See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 525 n.312; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise
and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 566 (2003)
(noting, in a slightly different context, that "[m]any [educational] institutions ...
may be tempted to plead academic autonomy" with respect to programs that are
wholly run by administrators and involve no meaningful faculty oversight at all).
377 See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An
Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 321
(1993) (noting that law schools, in some sense, "have less autonomy than traditional
academic departments" because of their affiliation with professional bodies such as
the ABA and state bar examiners); Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1555 n.305 (suggesting
that "[o]ne might ...

suspect that at least some law schools have .. .surrendered to

the hard or soft coercions of other organizations, such as the American Association of
Law Schools (AALS), whose policies require member schools not to permit discrimination on campus").
378 Professor Morriss suggests that most schools in fact do not make strong efforts
to toss out other employers, including private law firms, that have engaged in discriminatory conduct. See Morriss, supra note 322, at 447 n.154.
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the military's discriminatory policies-Congress not least among
them. 3 79 One might also ask whether these schools were equally
determined to restrict access to the military and other discriminatory
institutions in a variety of contexts besides recruiting-for example, in
38 0
providing access to guest speakers.
In sum, in a variety of circumstances, one might reasonably question the good faith of a law school that invoked its academic mission
as the basis for the exclusion of military recruiters. Much would
depend on how "academic" that decision really was, and how consistently the law school followed its purported mission. Diane Mazur
makes a strong case that the law schools' mission would be far better
served if law schools welcomed the military to campus, in order to
engage with it and reduce the divide that separates the military and
civilian worlds.3 8 1 Before we get to that point, however, we must first
ask whether all of the law school plaintiffs in FAIR really meant what
they said, or whether their course of conduct in other areas belied the
position they took in the Solomon Amendment litigation.
In short, for at least some of the plaintiffs in FAIR, a full consideration of their own sense of their academic mission, and their own
sense of what academic freedom required for them as university
departments, might have led them to conclude that they could not
expel the military recruiters consistently with their own understanding
of their mission. We might thus conclude that at least some of the law
school plaintiffs in FAIR, by invoking judicial deference for a set of
assertions that were motivated more by their political views or legal
strategies than by genuinely academic considerations, and that were
dictated more by the desire to oust the military from campus than by
any serious consideration of their academic missions as law schools,
38 2
failed their moral obligations as would-be deferees.
379 See id.; see also Mazur, supra note 49, at 516 (calling such an argument "disingenuous" when it is made by defenders of the Solomon Amendment, but acknowledging that "this argument raises a fair point," and suggesting that "[t] he singular focus
of law schools on the military as a target of their expressive disagreement may well be
misdirected and incomplete"); Posner, supra note 274, at 51 (noting that "the offices
of the general counsel of ... the Defense Department," among other employers, are
welcome at law school functions).
380 See Mazur, supra note 49, at 505.
381 See id.; see also Posner, supra note 274, at 57 (noting "the possibility that by
discouraging military recruiters," elite schools with a substantially liberal student body
.are helping to perpetuate a conservative military culture").
382 Cf Katyal, supra note 376, at 566 (stating that where universities plead educational autonomy with respect to choices that are not the product of meaningful
faculty deliberation, Grutterdeference "becomes a lawyer's trick, a way to help a client
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Some concluding observations are in order. First, I may be
wrong. Perhaps all of the plaintiff law schools saw their academic mission as distinctly normative and genuinely believed, as an academic
matter and after careful deliberation, that nondiscriminatory on-campus recruiting was essential to their missions as law schools. If so, that
sort of academic judgment possesses an epistemic and legal authority
that is fully entitled to judicial deference.3 8 3 Indeed, I am sure that at
least some of the schools involved in the FAIR litigation easily met this
obligation. 38 4 However, if some of the FAIR plaintiffs' claims were
essentially a litigation position and not a genuinely academic judgment, then those plaintiffs failed to meet their obligations as deferees.
Second, it should be clear that there is a distinction between the
judgment the broader academic community might reach about the
FAIR plaintiffs' actions, and the judgment that the Court ought to
have reached. If the FAIR plaintiffs made what appeared to be a
good-faith argument to the Court that their academic missions
required excluding military recruiters and that the Solomon Amendment interfered with their missions, then the Court ought to have
deferred to this argument. But the Supreme Court is not the only
forum ofjudgment, or even the most important forum. 38 5 If universities are entitled to deference on epistemic and legal authority
grounds, and if that entitlement carries with it significant moral obligations on the part of the deferee, then the legal academic community is surely in the best position to judge whether the FAIR plaintiffs
met those moral obligations. I have argued that the courts were not
entitled to second-guess the law schools. But as members of the academic community, we are fully entitled, if not obliged, to do so.386
convert their policy into something that appears and sounds more lofty and principled than it really is").
383 Cf Blocher, supra note 367, at 863 ("As with agency interpretations of their
own regulations, organizations' interpretations of their animating institutional norms
should be entitled to deference.").
384 I am informed, for instance, that the Solomon Amendment, and the appropriate response to it, was a subject of substantial and meaningful discussion among a
substantial number of the Yale Law School faculty.
385 See Blocher, supra note 367, at 864-65 ("[I]nstitutions, rather than the state,
are the primary regulators of speech. The most powerful-though perhaps not the
most obvious-speech 'regulations' are social norms and mores, backed by the threat
of social ostracism or sanction.").
386 J. Peter Byrne makes a similar point in a discussion of the judicial invalidation
of university speech codes.

See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic

Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 101 (2004) (criticizing such decisions and suggesting that
the decision whether to impose such codes, "even if incorrect, should have been left to
[university] institutional authorities" rather than the courts (emphasis added)). Simi-
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My conclusions may be clarified further by comparison with those
of another commentator on the FAIR decision, Judge Richard Posner.
Posner writes that the law schools' arguments in FAIR which he
believes ranged from the merely weak to the frivolous, tell us much
about the stultification that results from the "left-liberal domination of
elite law school faculties." 387 He pooh-poohs most of the claims made
by the law school plaintiffs in FAIR that would fall under the rubric of
Grutterdeference. For example, he suggests it is "hyperbole" for the
American Association of Law Schools, which served as an amicus in
the case, to argue that law schools are being forced to "abandon
[their] commitment to fight discrimination." 3 8 3 He notes, disapprovingly, that the law schools are effectively "limit[ing] their students'
exposure to views concerning military policy that are contrary to the
orthodoxy that dominates the law school community."38 9 And he says
that the FAIR plaintiffs' description of themselves as normative communities demonstrates the "uncritical assumption that legal education
390
has a liberal agenda."
Posner, in his typically vivid way, dramatically overstates his case.
Among other things, he understates the intellectual and political
diversity of the elite law schools he picks on-which may be greater, in
fact, than that of some of the less elite law schools that belonged to
FAIR. But that does not mean there is not a kernel of truth here.
Like Posner, I think most law schools should encourage a heterodoxy
of views, and that the exclusion of military recruiters was in some tension with this principle. 39 1 And I agree with Diane Mazur's important
argument that elite and liberal law schools, far from seeking to keep
larly, Michael Stokes Paulsen has argued that private nonreligious law schools may
have a legal right to discriminate against certain religious employers in providing
access to their placement services, while arguing that such schools would be wrong to
do so and should be criticized by others if they do. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How
Yale Law School Trivializes Religious Devotion, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1259, 1262-63
(1997).
387 Posner, supra note 274, at 57.
388 Id. at 52-53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
389 Id. at 54.
390 Id. at 56.
391 My point should not be overstated. There is a vast difference between attempting to exclude discriminatory recruiters and attempting to exclude dissenting viewpoints; one might allow on-campus speakers to defend discrimination in military
recruiting, for example, while refusing to permit discriminatory conduct on campus.
There is a tension, though, in encouraging vigorous campus speech, while excluding
the military rather than engaging in open disagreement with it on campus. That is, of
course, what the law school plaintiffs in FAIR sought to do.
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the military off campus, ought to welcome it, in an effort to bridge the
3 92
increasing gap between the military and civilian cultures.
I part ways more sharply with Posner in two respects. First, like
the FAIR Court itself, Posner is implicitly imposing an orthodoxy of
his own: the view that all law schools have essentially the same mission,
and should be denied relief where they claim otherwise. His view that
it must be hyperbole to state that the Solomon Amendment forces law
schools to abandon key aspects of their mission suggests that Posner,
like the FAIR Court, knows what the law schools' mission is, and this
isn't it. "American law schools are professional schools, not secular
madrasahs," he writes, loading the dice more than a little with his
phrasing.3 93 Therefore, they cannot or should not be the kind of
"normative institutions" the FAIR plaintiffs claimed they were.3 94
Many law schools doubtless fit the professional model Posner
describes, and one may question their good faith where they act
inconsistently with this mission. Perhaps some of the institutions in
FAIR are subject to this criticism. But there is no reason to assume, let
alone require, that all law schools, or all universities generally, share
precisely the same mission. Some law schools may require orthodoxy;
they may consider nondiscrimination in all aspects of school life to be
central to their missions; they may, to use his loaded phrase, be closer
to secular madrasahs than plain-vanilla professional schools. There is
ample room for diversity of mission in the world of law schools, just as
there is ample room for students and faculty members to choose to
join law schools with distinct normative missions or not.39 5

FAIR's

mistake, and Posner's too, is to imply that law schools all come in one
flavor, and to dismiss any claim that some law schools might just have
a different set of educational goals and a different set of needsincluding the exclusion of military recruiters-with respect to achiev3 96
ing those goals.
392 See Mazur, supra note 49, at 498-510.
393 Posner, supra note 274, at 56.
394 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
395 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1547-49.
396 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediariesin the Age of Cyberspace,
45 UCLA L. REv. 1653, 1656 (1998) ("[Slome private communities have expressive
identities that themselves ought be permitted to be diverse, including with respect to
the diversity of speech they tolerate within themselves."). Consider again Professor
Karlan's observation that the Justices, who all graduated from "elite law schools," are
both "more trusting, and more skeptical," about how law schools operate. Karlan,
supranote 199, at 1615. Of course, not all law schools must look and act like "elite law
schools," and some may choose to depart from the nonnormative "professional"
model that Posner (and the Court) point to as the presumptive standard in legal
education. See Posner, supra note 274, at 56.

1138

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:3

Posner's commentary on FAIR raises a second important issue:
the question of who decides. Like the FAIR Court, Posner effectively
holds the FAIR plaintiffs up to the standard of his own vision of what a
university does. But that approach is one thing in an academic article,
and quite another in an opinion of the Court. It may be a reasonable
view, but it is insufficiently deferential. It is not enough to conclude
that the law schools were engaging in "hyperbole" when they argued
for the importance of excluding military recruiters, or to say that the
schools assume "uncritic [ally]" that "legal education has a liberal
agenda."3 9 7 Rather, the courts should start with the assumption that
where a law school asserts such a mission, they are obliged to defer to
it, on epistemic and legal authority grounds. Conversely, the law
schools themselves must remember their moral obligation as deferees
to live by their words: to act meaningfully and consistently in accordance with the educational mission that they invoke as a basis for judicial deference.
Thus, the assertions about the importance of nondiscrimination
put forward by the AALS were not "hyperbole" ifthe law schools in
question genuinely believed them-if they genuinely reached such a
conclusion after meaningful academic deliberation, and acted in
accordance with this conclusion. Similarly, many law schools may
"uncritical[ly]" assume that legal education has a liberal agenda.39 8
But other schools may have reached a critical, considered academic
judgment that their mission involves "a liberal agenda in which homosexual rights occupy a high place. ' 39 9 The question in these cases
should not be whether this is a good or bad thing, but whether the
schools have reached a meaningful academic decision that this is so; if
they have, the courts should defer substantially to the schools' own
sense of the requirements of their mission.
Of course, the rest of us need not defer, and we academics will be
in a fair position to ask whether these schools have met their obligations as deferees. Thus, for schools with such a sense of mission, consistency might well require that faculty become meaningfully involved
in the on-campus recruitment process rather than leaving that task to
administrators, or that such schools exclude other bodies that are also
responsible for "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"-Congress, the Department of
Defense, and the rest of the executive branch among them-as
recruiters, and, perhaps, as speakers too. We may criticize such
schools, as deferees, for failing to live up to the mission they told the
397 Posner, supra note 274, at 52, 56.
398 Id. at 56.
399 Id.
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Court was so essential to their continued flourishing. Or we may disagree with such missions altogether. Again, however, that judgment is
primarily a question of the moral obligations of the law schools as
deferees. It does notjustify either the Court's or Posner's assumption
that the law schools must comply with a particular conception of the
academic mission of the law school, however familiar it may be.
In short, the Court was too quick to dismiss the law schools' case
in FAIR The argument for Grutter deference in this case was far
stronger than the Court's silence suggests. But it is also possible that
some of the law school plaintiffs in FAIR were wrong to bring the case.
The approach to deference that I have argued for here demands that
law schools and other entities fully consider, and then make every
effort to live consistently with, their own sense of their academic mission rather than use deference as a mere tool to achieve nonacademic
objectives. Again, I am sure that at least some of the law schools
involved in the FAIR litigation lived up to that obligation. But we are
entitled to reasonable suspicion as to whether all of them did. If that
suspicion is justified, we are left with the conclusion that the law
schools ought, perhaps, to have won the day in FAIR, but also ought to
be subject to substantial criticism outside the courts.
D.

Conclusion

The story of FAIR is ultimately about the Court's failure to fully
confront the occasions for, and complexities of, deference as a tool in
constitutional law. The Court's treatment of the competing claims to
deference in this case was clumsy at best. It drastically overplayed the
military deference hand, and paid lip service to the claim of Dale deference while eviscerating the case from which it stems.
More disappointing still was the Court's failure even to acknowledge that universities, as First Amendment institutions that are central
to the formation of public discourse and that possess significant
expertise about their own missions, are entitled to deference as universities. Had it done so, and had it untangled more skillfully the
competing claims to deference that were present in the case, the outcome in FAIR might have been significantly different.
This conclusion does not let the law schools themselves off the
hook. Deference involves significant obligations on the part of the
deferee, and it is far from clear that all of the law school plaintiffs truly
met those obligations. There are good reasons to think that, in some
instances, their position was one of convenience rather than an exercise of genuine academic judgment. If that is so, they can and should
be criticized for it. But that criticism should be a matter for the judg-
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ment of their academic peers, not the federal courts. The Court
might have asked whether the law schools were genuinely acting
within the scope of their epistemic and legal authority, and thus
whether deference was really warranted. If they were, it should have
deferred; if they were not, then perhaps no deference would be warranted. That it failed to even ask the question is evidence that the
Court simply failed to understand the real, and difficult, questions of
deference that were present in FAIR
IV.

DEFERENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES, AND
INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY

In this last Part, I want to situate this Article within the larger

firmament of constitutional theory, and show that this Article ultimately contributes to, and draws connections between, two broad
developments in recent constitutional scholarship. To make this
argument, it is necessary to step back for a moment and introduce two
emerging themes in constitutional and First Amendment theory.
Consider first the growth in recent years of a substantial body of
scholarly literature exploring the gap between constitutional meaning
and constitutional implementation.400 This literature argues that "a gap
can exist between the meaning of constitutional guarantees, on the
one hand, and judicially enforceable rights, on the other."4° 1 Thus,
"we should understand the Supreme Court's role" not in terms of "a
search for the Constitution's one true meaning," but "as a more multifaceted one of 'implementing' constitutional norms. '40 2 This litera40 3
ture has been referred to as "constitutional decision rules" theory.
Under various labels, this project has been pursued in recent works by
such writers as Richard Fallon, 40 4 Mitchell Berman, 40 5 Kermit
Roosevelt, 40 6 and David Chang. 40 7 More controversially, the interest
400

See Mitchell N. Berman, AspirationalRights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV.

L. REV. F. 220, 220 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/
march06/berman.pdf (noting that the last ten years have "witnessed a steady increase
in scholarly attention to the meaning/doctrine distinction").
401 Fallon, supra note 129, at 1276.
402 R
AcImDH. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001).
403 See Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 (2004).
404 See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 402; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); Fallon, supra note 129.
405 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 403, at 13; Berman, supra note 400.
406 See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIviSM (2006);
Roosevelt, supra note 162; Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 193 (2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/
march06/roosevelt.pdf [hereinafter Roosevelt, Underenforcement].
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in constitutional decision rules also finds a home in the recent writ40
and Rick Hills. 40
ings of Daryl Levinson

9

All of these writers can trace their ancestry back to seminal works
by Henry Monaghan 4 10 and Larry Sager, 4 11 who began exploring

questions of constitutional implementation in the 1970s-and still further back to James Thayer, whose classic work on judicial review first
41 2
brought to light these questions of constitutional implementation.
407 See David Chang, Structuring Constitutional Doctrine: Principles, Proof and the
Functions of Judicial Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 777 (2006).
408 See, e.g.,
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 861 (1999).

409 See, e.g., Hills, supranote 2, at 175. I say "controversially" because scholars like
Levinson and Hills purport to write against scholars like Fallon, arguing that no "gap
exists between 'pure' constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine," because
"the meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation." Id. Similarly, Professor Levinson argues that "[t]he rights-essentialist picture, in which courts begin
with the pure, Platonic ideal of a constitutional right and only then pragmatically
apply the right through the vehicles of implementation and remediation, bears little
resemblance to the actual judicial practice of rights-construction," in which "constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns." Levinson, supra note 408, at 873. These scholars have thus been described as writing
against "antipragmatist" constitutional theory, see Hills, supranote 2, at 173, or against
the "taxonom[ical]" approach of scholars such as Fallon or Berman, see Berman,
supra note 400, at 220.
I do not mean to elide the differences between these two groups of scholars.
Nevertheless, for my purposes they have much in common. One set of scholars
argues that it is still meaningful to talk about constitutional meaning as distinct from
constitutional implementation, while the other argues that there is only implementation, all the way down. But both ultimately stress the importance of the "forwardlooking, empirical, and all-things-considered analyses [that] pervade constitutional
adjudication," as against attempts to see constitutional law only in light of historical
meaning or pure "principle." Fallon, supra note 129, at 1314; see also Hills, supra note
2, at 181 ("Professor Fallon agrees that implementation of the law has critical importance for constitutional doctrine. Our only difference is that he would distinguish
between pure constitutional meaning and implementation, whereas I maintain that
implementation is inextricably a part of constitutional meaning."). In ways that are
relevant to this Article, then, both sets of scholars inhabit the same corner of constitutional law scholarship. See Roosevelt, Underenforcement, supra note 406, at 195 (arguing that Professor Levinson's article, see Levinson, supra note 408, "is a contribution,
and an excellent one, to the body of decision rules scholarship," although Professor
Levinson "does not seem to see it that way").
410 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 I-LAuv. L. REv.
1 (1975).
411 See Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 I-HAv. L. Rv. 1212 (1978).
412 See Thayer, supra note 27, at 129-32; see also Roosevelt, Underenforcement, supra
note 406, at 193 n.3 (characterizing Thayer's famous article as "mark[ing] the distinctive nature of judicial decision rules").
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But these more recent efforts have brought renewed and focused
attention to the importance of constitutional implementation.
Whether or not it is accurate to say that such views now command
academic consensus, 4 13 there is no doubt that this is a burgeoning
field of constitutional scholarship. Despite the advances made, however, much remains to be done in exploring implementation as a cen4 14
tral subject of constitutional law, especially at the operational level.

Alongside the developing scholarship on the importance of constitutional implementation, another body of constitutional scholarship has also emerged, more or less simultaneously and separately.
This literature argues for a dramatic rethinking and refashioning of
the First Amendment. It argues that First Amendment doctrine
should partially or wholly abandon its customary top-down, institutionally agnostic approach 41 5 in favor of a bottom-up, institutionally
sensitive approach that openly "takes First Amendment institutions
seriously." 4 16 It argues that courts "ought to recognize the unique
social role played by a variety of institutions," such as universities, the
press, religious associations, and libraries, "whose contributions to
public discourse play a fundamental role in our system of free
speech." 417 Accordingly, courts should "defer[] to the practices of
[these] particular kinds of First Amendment actors,'

418

in ways shaped

41 9
by the norms and practices of the institutions themselves.

413 See RoosEvELT, supra note 406, at 36 ("The basic idea that there is a significant
difference between doctrine and meaning is fairly widely accepted among legal
scholars.").
414 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 129, at 1321 ("Frank recognition of the judicial
function in crafting and choosing among judicially manageable standards triggers
questions about judicial power and competence that have not received much helpful
study.... Questions about the empirical predicates for constitutional analysis cry out
for further examination."); id. at 1322, 1331 (arguing that the notion of a meaning/
implementation gap in constitutional law "furnishes an agenda" for further academic
work, and suggesting some possible lines of inquiry); see also Roosevelt, Underenforcement, supra note 406, at 193-95 & n.4 (collecting some examples of recent uses of the
"distinction between decision rules and operative propositions" to "examine and critique particular areas of doctrine").
415 See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text.
416 Horwitz, supra note 4, at 589.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 570.
419 See, e.g., id. at 572-73; see also Hills, supra note 81, at 188 ("Institutional theories define rights as rules that allocate preemptive jurisdiction to [certain] institutions... based on that institution's likelihood of making decisions appropriate to the
social sphere in which it operates.").
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Although these ideas are sometimes discernible within the
existing body of First Amendment doctrine, 420 this literature aims to
bring this approach to the fore and refine it, urging the Court to
adopt an institutional approach to the First Amendment "explicitly,
transparently, and self-consciously." 421 The charter member of this
school is surely Frederick Schauer, 4 2 2 although other signal contributions have been made by Rick Hills,4 23 Daniel Halberstam, 42 4 Mark
Rosen, 425 David Fagundes, 426 and Joseph Blocher. 427 I have made my
own modest contributions to this literature. 42 8 This Article, too, contributes to that body of work, by examining the FAIR Court's missed
opportunity to defer to the law school plaintiffs as First Amendment
institutions. 4 29 Here, too, however, although much has already been
43 0
done, much remains to be said in fleshing out this approach.
420 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 4, at 569-71; Schauer, supra note 4, at 1759-60.
421 Horwitz, Blog, supra note 8, at 61.
422 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 4, 1759-60; Schauer, Principles, supra note 3, at
84-86; Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1803, 1815-16 (1999).
423 See Hills, supra note 2, at 175.
424 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 778, 828 (1999).
425 See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical
Examination of Term Limits,Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-PornographyOrdinances, 21
J.L. & POL. 223, 224 (2005); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring
ConstitutionalPrinciples, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1516 (2005).
426 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REv.
1637, 1676-78 (2006).
427 See Blocher, supra note 367, at 847-51.
428 See Horwitz, supra note 4, 471-72 (offering an approach to thinking about the
Court's treatment of "First Amendment institutions," and applying that approach to
universities as First Amendment institutions); Horwitz, Blog, supra note 8, at 61 (discussing the press generally, and blogs specifically, as First Amendment institutions);
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 1503-04 (exploring further the question of universities' status as First Amendment institutions). Just as the constitutional implementation literature has its forebears, so does the institutional First Amendment literature, which
finds a progenitor in the work of Robert C. Post. See, e.g., Post, supra note 21, at 1272,
1280-81 (arguing that "[t]he Court must reshape its [First Amendment] doctrine so
as to generate a perspicuous understanding of the necessary material and normative
dimensions of ...[various] forms of social order and of the relationship of speech to
these values and dimensions"). Post's writing, however, is more concerned with
"broader organizing principles for social discourse" than it is with identifying particular First Amendment institutions. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 567 n.488; see also
Schauer, supra note 8, at 1273 n.87 (noting that Post's work is "concerned with social
structure and the identification of special free speech domains").
429 See supra Part III.D.
430 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 1273 (describing his argument for an institutional
First Amendment as "a relatively new avenue of inquiry").
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Indeed, an institutional approach to the First Amendment may simply
be the leading edge of a developing study of the role institutions play
43
across a broad range of constitutional doctrines. 1
Although the literature on constitutional decision rules and the
literature on the institutional First Amendment have developed separately, one goal of this Article is to suggest that there are a variety of
important links between these two discussions, although it is not clear
that the two groups of scholars have recognized this connection. 4 32
What connects them is deference.
With respect to constitutional decision rules theory, the courts'
substantial reliance on deference to a variety of public and private
institutions serves as valuable evidence of the existence of the gap
between constitutional meaning and constitutional implementation. 43 3 Furthermore, to the extent that decision rules theorists focus
on describing and refining the ways in which courts implement the
Constitution, deference is obviously a vital tool in the array of devices
that the courts rely on in carrying out that task of implementation.
Likewise, with respect to institutional First Amendment theory, deference is the doctrinal device by which courts are able to clear a space
for the autonomy of various First Amendment institutions.
Once deference is identified as the fulcrum between constitutional decision rules scholarship and institutional First Amendment
scholarship, one can identify the ways in which each of these schools
feeds into and enriches the other. Scholars writing about the importance of constitutional decision rules have recognized that their
approach opens up a space for shared constitutional interpretation by

431

See Symposium, Constitutional "Niches" The Role of InstitutionalContext in Consti-

tutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1463 (2007). Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, 'in a
series of powerful articles, have also explored the ways in which courts can "devolve []
deliberative authority for fully specifying norms to local actors" instead of "laying
down specific rules" to guide the conduct of various public and private actors.
Michael C. Doff, Legal Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875,
961, 978 (2003); see also Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-88 (1998) (arguing for "a new

model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of
modern life," in which judicial review, among other devices of government, would

"leave room for experimental elaboration and revision to accommodate varied and
changing circumstances" while still protecting individual rights).
432 Ironically so, given that Professor Hills has contributed to both bodies of literature. See Hills, supra note 81 (contribution to institutional First Amendment literature); Hills, supra note 2 (contribution to constitutional decision rules literature).
433 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 129, at 1300-02.
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other institutions, 434 but much remains to be said about what this
shared space should look like and how it should operate. Moreover,
their focus has been primarily on how decision rules theory can help
us understand the role of other public bodies, especially Congress and
the administrative agencies. Institutional First Amendment theory,
which has already discussed at some length the ways in which institutions such as universities or the press might be treated as autonomous
institutions under the First Amendment, 43 5 fleshes out our understanding of how a shared approach to the implementation of constitutional doctrine might operate. It also suggests that the focus on how
courts might share the task of constitutional implementation with
other branches of government is too narrow. Courts also may create a
space for shared constitutional interpretation by a variety of private
actors, especially First Amendment institutions like law schools, the
press, religious associations, and others. Institutional First Amendment theory thus helps supply some of the details that constitutional
decision rules theory lacks.
Conversely, those writers who have argued in favor of an institutional approach to the First Amendment have provided a detailed discussion of how that institutional approach might work, but have not
fully situated their approach within the broader framework of constitutional theory. Moreover, their work has given rise to concerns
about the legitimacy of an institutional approach, inasmuch as it might
require modifications to current First Amendment doctrine. 43 6 Constitutional decision rules theory provides an answer to both of these
problems. It situates institutional First Amendment theory by arguing
that such an approach finds a home in the space between constitutional meaning and constitutional implementation. And by linking it
to a larger theoretical framework, it legitimates the institutional
approach as a theoretically grounded alternative to current First
Amendment doctrine.
Thus we see that both of these emerging bodies of constitutional
literature, with their shared interest in deference, have much to gain
from each other. Institutional First Amendment theory advances the
practical goals of constitutional decision rules theory. In turn, decision rules theory supplies First Amendment institutionalism with legit434

See, e.g., Berman, supra note 403, at 112 (noting that "the decision-rule charac-

terization is likely to open up more space for (appropriate) congressional involvement in the shaping of constitutional doctrine").
435 See supra notes 422-28 (citing sources).
436 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89
MINN. L. REv. 1407, 1410 (2005); David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L.
REv. 1416, 1432 (2005).
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imacy and a place on the constitutional map. Although these schools
have emerged separately, this Article suggests that they might profit
considerably from a deeper mutual engagement.
CONCLUSION

Although deference is a pervasive tool in constitutional doctrine,
it is surprisingly underdeveloped as an area of study in constitutional
law. This Article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of
when, why, and how the courts go about deferring to a variety of other
public and private actors. In that sense, FAIR offers a useful opportunity for us to assess just how undertheorized the Court's own use of
deference is, and how this failure to fully understand its own doctrinal
tool left the Court at sea when it faced competing claims to deference
in the same case.
When faced with these competing claims in FAIR, the Court fumbled, placing far too much emphasis on Congress' invocation of deference and far too little on the universities' invocation of deference. In
particular, the Court paid far too little attention to the epistemic and
legal authority of law schools as First Amendment institutions-sites
in which public discourse is shaped autonomously in accord with the
best traditions of such institutions. By the same token, even if FAIR
represents a failure by the Court, it is not clear that the law school
plaintiffs performed much better. As deferees, they too had an obligation-to invoke only so much deference as they deserved, depending
on the extent to which their desire to exclude military recruiters was
genuinely a thoughtful academic judgment. If it was not, it deserves
criticism. But that criticism should not have come from the courts,
but from the law schools' peers in epistemic and legal authority-the
legal academy and other members of the broader university community. If the law schools failed in their obligations as deferees, we can
criticize them without absolving the Court.
Finally, a study of FAIR, and of the phenomenon of deference in
constitutional law, yields benefits far beyond this one case. It offers
evidence of a significant link between two emerging areas of constitutional scholarship, which thus far have traveled along separate tracks:
the study of constitutional decision rules, and the study of First
Amendment institutions. This Article may thus be the opening move
in what might prove to be a very profitable discourse between these
two important additions to the scholarly dialogue on the Constitution.

